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but opportunity; is not properly peace, but fear, and therefore is not commanded by nature. Now to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future caution, peace itself it seems is not pleasing: which is contrary to the natural law.

11. The sixth precept of the natural law is, that in revenge and punishments we must have our eye not at the evil past, but the future good: that is, it is not lawful to inflict punishment for any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by his punishment may become better. But this is confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the future, as hath been showed in the foregoing

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to the precepts of nature, he shows clearly that he hath a mind to fulfil all those laws; which is all we are obliged to by rational nature. Now he that hath done all he is obliged to, is a just man.

31. All writers do agree, that the natural law is the same with the moral. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know, therefore, that good and evil are names given to things to signify the inclination or aversion of them, by whom they were given. But the inclinations of men are diverse, according to their diverse constitutions, customs, opinions; as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what this man

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they were given. But the inclinations of men are diverse, according to their diverse constitutions, customs, opinions; as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what this man commends, (that is to say, calls good) the other undervalues, as being evil. Nay, very often the same man at diverse times praises and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they do, necessary it is there should be discord and strife. They are, therefore, so long in the state of war, as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites, they mete good and evil by diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as they are in

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(that is to say, calls good) the other undervalues, as being evil. Nay, very often the same man at diverse times praises and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they do, necessary it is there should be discord and strife. They are, therefore, so long in the state of war, as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites, they mete good and evil by diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as they are in it, to be evil, and by consequence that peace is good. They therefore who could not agree concerning a present, do agree concerning a future good; which indeed is a work of reason; for things present are obvious to the sense, things to come to our reason only. Reason declaring peace to be

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very often the same man at diverse times praises and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they do, necessary it is there should be discord and strife. They are, therefore, so long in the state of war, as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites, they mete good and evil by diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as they are in it, to be evil, and by consequence that peace is good. They therefore who could not agree concerning a present, do agree concerning a future good; which indeed is a work of reason; for things present are obvious to the sense, things to come to our reason only. Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and

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the bad actions which please them, are ever entituled to some virtue. Whence it comes to pass that the same action is praised by these, and called virtue, and dispraised by those, and termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found by philosophers for this matter. For since they could not observe the goodness of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to peace, and the evil in this, that it related to discord, they built a moral philosophy wholly estranged from the moral law, and unconstant to itself. For they would have the nature of virtues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity between two extremes, and the vices in the extremes themselves; which is apparently false. For to dare is commended, and, under the name of

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chapter, the first verse: This Melchisedec was king of Salem, priest of the most high God, &c. (Verse 2): First being by interpretation king of righteousness, and after that also king of Salem, which is, king of peace. Whence it is clear, that Christ the King, in his kingdom placeth righteousness and peace together. Psalm 34. 13:e Eschew evil and do good; seek peace and ensue f it. Isaiah 9. 6, 7: Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace. Isaiah 52. 7: How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that

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if thou have stricken thy hand with a stranger, thou art snared with the words of thy mouth.

6. The third law concerning gratitude, is proved by these places. Deut. 25. 4: Thou shalt not muzzle the ox, when he treadeth out the corn: which St. Paul (1 Cor. 9. 9) interprets to be spoken of men, not oxen only. Prov. 17. 13: Whoso rewardeth evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house. And Deut. 20. 10, 11: When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. Prov. 3. 29: Devise not evil

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thy hand with a stranger, thou art snared with the words of thy mouth.

6. The third law concerning gratitude, is proved by these places. Deut. 25. 4: Thou shalt not muzzle the ox, when he treadeth out the corn: which St. Paul (1 Cor. 9. 9) interprets to be spoken of men, not oxen only. Prov. 17. 13: Whoso rewardeth evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house. And Deut. 20. 10, 11: When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. Prov. 3. 29: Devise not evil against thy

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evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house. And Deut. 20. 10, 11: When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. Prov. 3. 29: Devise not evil against thy neighbour, seeing he dwelleth securely by thee.

7. To the fourth law of accommodating ourselves, these precepts are conformable: Exod. 23. 4, 5: If thou meet thine enemy's ox, or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee, lying under his burden, and wouldst forbear to help him, thou

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15. 18: A wrathful man stirreth up strife; but he that is slow to anger, appeaseth strife. Prov. 18. 24: There is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother. The same is confirmed, Luke 10, by the parable of the Samaritan, who had compassion on the Jew that was wounded by thieves; and by Christ's precept (Matth. 5. 39): But I say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also &c.

8. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth law, these are some: Matth. 6. 14, 15: If you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly father will also forgive you: but if you forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. Matth.

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two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. But to love our neighbour as ourselves, is nothing else but to grant him all we desire to have granted to ourselves.

13. By the tenth law respect of persons is forbid; as also by these places following: Matth. 5. 45: That ye may be children of your Father which is in heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the evil, and on the good, &c. Coloss. 3. 11: There is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian or Scythian, bond or free, but Christ is all, and in all. Acts 10. 34: Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons. 2 Chron. 19. 7: There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of gifts. Ecclesiasticus

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to them how that the commands of God are broken, not by deeds only, but also by the will. For the Scribes and Pharisees did in outward act observe the law most exactly, but for glory's sake only; else they would as readily have broken it. There are innumerable places of Scripture in which is most manifestly declared, that God accepts the will for the deed, and that as well in good as in evil actions.

22. That the law of nature is easily kept, Christ himself declares (Matth. 11. 28, 29, 30): Come unto me, &c. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, &c.; for my yoke is easy, and my burden light.

23. Lastly, the rule by which I said any man might know, whether what he was doing were contrary to the

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civil society is. 10. What a civil person is. 11. What it is to have the supreme power, and what to be a subject. 12. Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.

1. It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the breach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem. Whence we may understand, that the natural laws, though well understood, do not instantly secure

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others, endeavour to innovate, and divers innovators innovate divers ways; which is a mere distraction and civil war. Fourthly, these brute creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify their affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse than in truth it is. But the tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition: and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered and lightened, and confounded whole Greece itself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harm; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellows.

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is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.

5. Now, the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this right, the sword of justice. But these kind of contracts men observe well

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their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.

6. Because, therefore,

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supreme authority.

9. Furthermore, since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth to peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being risen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like; which every man esteems according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what

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and dishonest, and the like; which every man esteems according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life. But those rules and measures are usually called the civil laws, or the laws of the city, as being the commands of him who hath the supreme power in the city. And the CIVIL LAWS (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him

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exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and in peace.

11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the will of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good and evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by which they may imagine that either by right

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one whereof hath an equal, to wit, a natural right to meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in what places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engross the supreme power to himself, and settle it on his own head. What monarch soever, therefore, hath a command in such a condition, he is bound by the law of nature, (set down in chap. 3. art. 8, of not returning evil for good) prudently to provide that by his death the city suffer not a dissolution; either by appointing a certain day and place, in which those subjects of his, who have a mind to it, may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a successor; whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit. He therefore, who on this foresaid manner hath received his

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impediments?

11. Another reason why a great assembly is not so fit for consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to make a long-continued speech; and to gain the more esteem from his auditors, he polishes and adorns it with the best and smoothest language. Now the nature of eloquence is to make good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, honest and dishonest, appear to be more or less than indeed they are; and to make that seem just which is unjust, according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh: for this is to persuade. And though they reason, yet take they not their rise from true principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which for the most

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that is to say, in a monarchy, on a monarch or king; and this is confirmed by the people's own judgment. 1 Sam. 8. 20; We also will be like all the nations, and our king shall JUDGE us, and go out before us, and fight our BATTLES. And what pertains to judgments, and all other matters whereof there is any controversy, whether they be good or evil, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon (1 Kings 3. 9): Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to JUDGE thy people, that I may discern between GOOD and EVIL. And that of Absolom (2 Sam. 15. 3): There is no man deputed of the king to hear thee.

3. That kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been showed above in the sixth chapter

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our king shall JUDGE us, and go out before us, and fight our BATTLES. And what pertains to judgments, and all other matters whereof there is any controversy, whether they be good or evil, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon (1 Kings 3. 9): Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to JUDGE thy people, that I may discern between GOOD and EVIL. And that of Absolom (2 Sam. 15. 3): There is no man deputed of the king to hear thee.

3. That kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been showed above in the sixth chapter and the twelfth article, King David also confirms; who, though Saul sought to slay him, did notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him, and forbade Abishai, saying (1

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Sam. xi. 12.

c 1 Sam. xxvi. 9.

d Matth. xxiii. 2, 3.

e says Christ.

f Rom. xiii. 1, 2.

g 1 Peter ii. 13-15.

h Matth. xxi. 2, 3.

i 1 Kings ii. 26, 27. CHAPTER XII. OF THE INTERNAL CAUSES TENDING TO THE

DISSOLUTION OF ANY GOVERNMENT.

1. That the judging of good and evil belongs to private persons is a seditious opinion. 2. That subjects do sin by obeying their princes is a seditious opinion. 3. That tyrannicide is lawful is a seditious opinion.
4. That those who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws is a seditious opinion. 5. That the supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion. 6. That faith

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passions contrary to peace, wherewith the minds of men are fitted and disposed; next, their quality and condition who solicit, assemble, and direct them, already thus disposed, to take up arms and quit their allegiance; lastly, the manner how this is done, or the faction itself. But one and the first which disposeth them to sedition, is this, that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equal right, and have a not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, [proved it in chap. 1. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown (chap. 6. art. 9)]b that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil, just

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good and evil belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equal right, and have a not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, [proved it in chap. 1. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown (chap. 6. art. 9)]b that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil. And the legislator is ever that person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that is to say, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in chap. 11. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For

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to the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, [proved it in chap. 1. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown (chap. 6. art. 9)]b that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil. And the legislator is ever that person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that is to say, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in chap. 11. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For if private men may pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his: Give therefore unto thy servant

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that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil. And the legislator is ever that person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that is to say, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in chap. 11. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For if private men may pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his: Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil. Since therefore it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil, wicked are those, though usual, sayings, that he only is a king who does righteously, and that kings

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that is to say, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in chap. 11. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For if private men may pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his: Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil. Since therefore it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil, wicked are those, though usual, sayings, that he only is a king who does righteously, and that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things; and many other such like. Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being

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in chap. 11. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For if private men may pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his: Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil. Since therefore it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil, wicked are those, though usual, sayings, that he only is a king who does righteously, and that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things; and many other such like. Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being relative to some command: and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it

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relative to some command: and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just or unjust, proceeds from the right of the magistrate. Legitimate kings therefore make the things they command just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them. But private men, while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as kings; which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient of all God's commands is (Gen. 2. 17): Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations (Gen. 3. 5): Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil; and God's first expostulation with man (verse 11): Who told thee

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things they command just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them. But private men, while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as kings; which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient of all God's commands is (Gen. 2. 17): Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations (Gen. 3. 5): Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil; and God's first expostulation with man (verse 11): Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to

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men, while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as kings; which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient of all God's commands is (Gen. 2. 17): Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations (Gen. 3. 5): Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil; and God's first expostulation with man (verse 11): Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shameful, except thou have arrogated to thyself the knowledge of good and evil?

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good and evil; and God's first expostulation with man (verse 11): Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shameful, except thou have arrogated to thyself the knowledge of good and evil?

2. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience, is a sin, for he who doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish. That is my sin indeed, which committing I do believe to be my sin; but what I believe to be another man's sin, I may sometimes do that without any sin of mine. For if I be commanded to do that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I

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of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects sin when they obey their prince's commands which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civil obedience; and it depends upon that original error which we have observed above, in the foregoing article. For by our taking upon us to judge of good and evil, we are the occasion that as well our obedience, as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.

3. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, that tyrannicide is lawful; nay, at this day it is by many divines, and of old it was by all the philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and Roman anarchies,

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but an enemy. If by right, then the divine interrogation takes place: Who hath told thee that he was a tyrant? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? For why dost thou call him a tyrant, whom God hath made a king, except that thou, being a private person, usurpest to thyself the knowledge of good and evil? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to that which is monarchical, we may hence discern; namely, that by it every king, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgment, and slain by the hand of every murderous villain.

4. The fourth adversary opinion c to civil society, is their's

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so too; and by consequence she is so. But that which holds true in a city, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly of men who have the supreme authority; for they make a city, which hath no being but by their supreme power. Now that this opinion cannot consist with the very being of government, is evident from hence; that by it the knowledge of what is good and evil, that is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not against the laws, would return to each single person. Obedience therefore will cease, as oft as anything seems to be commanded contrary to the civil laws, and together with it all coercive jurisdiction; which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of government. Yet this error hath great props,

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not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith; or why any man, who is truly a Christian, should not be a prophet; or lastly, why every man should not judge what is fit for him to do, what to avoid, rather out of his own inspiration, than by the precepts of his superiors or right reason. A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of good and evil; which cannot be granted without the ruin of all governments. This opinion hath spread itself so largely through the whole Christian world, that the number of apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite. And it sprang from sick-brained men, who having gotten good store of holy words by frequent reading of the Scriptures, made such a connexion of them usually in their

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majestatis naturally cleaves to these opinions.

9. There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man than poverty, or the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life and honour. And though there be no man but knows that riches are gotten with industry, and kept by frugality, yet all the poor commonly lay the blame on the evil government, excusing their own sloth and luxury; as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by public exactions. But men must consider, that they who have no patrimony, must not only labour that they may live, but fight too that they may labour. Every one of the Jews, who in Esdras' time built the walls of Jerusalem, did the work with one hand, and held the sword in the

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work itself which they have to do. For they could not poison the people with those absurd opinions contrary to peace and civil society, unless they held them themselves; which sure is an ignorance greater than can well befall any wise man. For he that knows not whence the laws derive their power, which are the rules of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, good and evil; what makes and preserves peace among men, what destroys it, what is his, and what another's; lastly, what he would have done to himself (that he may do the like to others) is surely to be accounted but meanly wise. But that they can turn their auditors out of fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who are ill-affected, seem worse, to them who are

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makes and preserves peace among men, what destroys it, what is his, and what another's; lastly, what he would have done to himself (that he may do the like to others) is surely to be accounted but meanly wise. But that they can turn their auditors out of fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who are ill-affected, seem worse, to them who are well-affected, seem evil; that they can enlarge their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond reason: this they have from that sort of eloquence, not which explains things as they are, but from that other, which by moving their minds, makes all things to appear to be such as they in their minds, prepared before, had already conceived them.

13. Many men, who are themselves very well

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of men to sedition, others which move and quicken them so disposed. Among those which dispose them, we have reckoned in the first place certain perverse doctrines. It is therefore the duty of those who have the chief authority, to root those out of the minds of men, not by commanding, but by teaching; not by the terror of penalties, but by the perspicuity of reasons. The laws whereby this evil may be withstood, are not to be made against the persons erring, but against the errors themselves. Those errors which, in the foregoing chapter, we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the commonweal, have crept into the minds of ignorant men, partly from the pulpit, partly from the daily discourses of men, who, by reason of little employment otherwise, do find leisure enough to

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more laws than necessarily serve for good of the magistrate and his subjects. For since men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do, by natural reason rather than any knowledge of the laws, where there are more laws than can easily be remembered, and whereby such things are forbidden as reason of itself prohibits not of necessity, they must through ignorance, without the least evil intention, fall within the compass of laws, as gins laid to entrap their harmless liberty; which supreme commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the laws of nature.

16. It is a great part of that liberty, which is harmless to civil government and necessary for each subject to live happily, that there be no penalties dreaded but what they

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there be no penalties dreaded but what they may both foresee and look for; and this is done, where there are either no punishments at all defined by the laws, or greater not required than are defined. Where there are none defined, there he that hath first broken the law, expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment; and his fear is supposed boundless, because it relates to an unbounded evil. Now the law of nature commands them who are not subject to any civil laws (by what we have said in chap. 3. art. 11,) and therefore supreme commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so much regard the past evil as the future good; and they sin, if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment than the public benefit. But where the punishment is defined;

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there he that hath first broken the law, expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment; and his fear is supposed boundless, because it relates to an unbounded evil. Now the law of nature commands them who are not subject to any civil laws (by what we have said in chap. 3. art. 11,) and therefore supreme commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so much regard the past evil as the future good; and they sin, if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment than the public benefit. But where the punishment is defined; either by a law prescribed, as when it is set down in plain words that he that shall do thus or thus, shall suffer so and so; or by practice, as when the penalty, (not by any law prescribed, but arbitrary from the beginning), is

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of subjects, that every man may without fear enjoy the rights which are allowed him by the laws. For it is in vain to have our own distinguished by the laws from another's, if by wrong judgment, robbery, theft,l they may be again confounded. But it falls out so, that these do happen where judges are corrupted. For the fear whereby men are deterred from doing evil, ariseth not from hence, namely, because penalties are set, but because they are executed. For we esteem the future by what is past, seldom expecting what seldom happens. If therefore judges corrupted either by gifts, favour, or even by pity itself, do often forbear the execution of the penalties due by the law, and by that means put wicked men in hope to pass unpunished: honest subjects

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action, whether against the law, as to overthrow another man's house, or not against the law, as to build his own upon the sand.

17. But when we speak of the laws, the word sin is taken in a more strict sense, and signifies not every thing done against right reason, but that only which is blameable; and therefore is e called malum culpae, the evil of fault. But yet if anything be culpable, it is not presently to be termed a sin or fault; but only if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what it is to be blameable with reason, what against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that good which he desires, and evil which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity

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and therefore is e called malum culpae, the evil of fault. But yet if anything be culpable, it is not presently to be termed a sin or fault; but only if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what it is to be blameable with reason, what against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that good which he desires, and evil which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that good, which another counts evil; and the same man what now he esteemed for good, he immediately looks f on as evil: and the same thing which he calls good in himself, he terms evil in another. For we all measure good and

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or fault; but only if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what it is to be blameable with reason, what against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that good which he desires, and evil which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that good, which another counts evil; and the same man what now he esteemed for good, he immediately looks f on as evil: and the same thing which he calls good in himself, he terms evil in another. For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their

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with reason, what against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that good which he desires, and evil which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that good, which another counts evil; and the same man what now he esteemed for good, he immediately looks f on as evil: and the same thing which he calls good in himself, he terms evil in another. For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equals, (by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both

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every one calls that good which he desires, and evil which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that good, which another counts evil; and the same man what now he esteemed for good, he immediately looks f on as evil: and the same thing which he calls good in himself, he terms evil in another. For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equals, (by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both seem and are irksome, and therefore evil to all; and men use to

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which he eschews. And therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that good, which another counts evil; and the same man what now he esteemed for good, he immediately looks f on as evil: and the same thing which he calls good in himself, he terms evil in another. For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equals, (by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both seem and are irksome, and therefore evil to all; and men use to repute those evil, that is to say, to lay some

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in himself, he terms evil in another. For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equals, (by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both seem and are irksome, and therefore evil to all; and men use to repute those evil, that is to say, to lay some fault to their charge, from whom they receive evil; it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general things, as that theft, adultery,

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For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equals, (by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both seem and are irksome, and therefore evil to all; and men use to repute those evil, that is to say, to lay some fault to their charge, from whom they receive evil; it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sins; as if they should

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or expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equals, (by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both seem and are irksome, and therefore evil to all; and men use to repute those evil, that is to say, to lay some fault to their charge, from whom they receive evil; it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sins; as if they should say that all men account those things evil, to which they have given names which are

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to their charge, from whom they receive evil; it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sins; as if they should say that all men account those things evil, to which they have given names which are usually taken in an evil sense. But we demand not whether theft be a sin, but what is to be termed theft; and so concerning other,g in like manner. Forasmuch therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable is not to be measured by the reason of one man more than another, because of the equality of

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to be determined by the consent of single men, whom the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sins; as if they should say that all men account those things evil, to which they have given names which are usually taken in an evil sense. But we demand not whether theft be a sin, but what is to be termed theft; and so concerning other,g in like manner. Forasmuch therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable is not to be measured by the reason of one man more than another, because of the equality of human nature; and there are no other reasons in being, but only those of

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not justly have punished or killed him although he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in punishing may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent, doth it therefore follow, that the right of afflicting and killing depends not on divine power, but on men's sins.

6. That question made famous by the disputations of the ancients: why evil things befell the good, and good things the evil: is the same with this of ours; by what right God dispenseth good and evil things unto men; and with its difficulty it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the divine Providence, but also of philosophers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psalm 73. 1, 2, 3: Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a

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he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in punishing may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent, doth it therefore follow, that the right of afflicting and killing depends not on divine power, but on men's sins.

6. That question made famous by the disputations of the ancients: why evil things befell the good, and good things the evil: is the same with this of ours; by what right God dispenseth good and evil things unto men; and with its difficulty it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the divine Providence, but also of philosophers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psalm 73. 1, 2, 3: Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart; but as for me, my feet were almost

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to some sin antecedent, doth it therefore follow, that the right of afflicting and killing depends not on divine power, but on men's sins.

6. That question made famous by the disputations of the ancients: why evil things befell the good, and good things the evil: is the same with this of ours; by what right God dispenseth good and evil things unto men; and with its difficulty it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the divine Providence, but also of philosophers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psalm 73. 1, 2, 3: Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart; but as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well nigh slipped. And why? I was grieved at the wicked; I do

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dictate, but by the way of covenant, that is to say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this covenant was presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the original of God's kingdom (which we treat of in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way; that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (whether the judicature of good and evil, or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden), God did require a most simple obedience to his commands, without dispute whether that were good or evil which was commanded. For the fruit of the tree, if the command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evil, that is

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that is to say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this covenant was presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the original of God's kingdom (which we treat of in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way; that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (whether the judicature of good and evil, or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden), God did require a most simple obedience to his commands, without dispute whether that were good or evil which was commanded. For the fruit of the tree, if the command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evil, that is to say, a sin.

3. Now the

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(which we treat of in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way; that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (whether the judicature of good and evil, or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden), God did require a most simple obedience to his commands, without dispute whether that were good or evil which was commanded. For the fruit of the tree, if the command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evil, that is to say, a sin.

3. Now the covenant between God and Abraham was made in this manner (Gen. 17. 7, 8): I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee

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of good and evil (whether the judicature of good and evil, or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden), God did require a most simple obedience to his commands, without dispute whether that were good or evil which was commanded. For the fruit of the tree, if the command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evil, that is to say, a sin.

3. Now the covenant between God and Abraham was made in this manner (Gen. 17. 7, 8): I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land

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last words to the people, saying (Deut. 31. 29): I know that after my death ye will utterly corrupt yourselves, and turn aside from the way that I have commanded you, &c. When therefore according to this prediction there arose another generation (Judges 2. 10, 11) who knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which he had done for Israel, the children of Israel did evil in the sight of the Lord, and served Balaam; to wit, they cast off God's government, that is to say, that of the priest, by whom God ruled; and afterward, when they were overcome by their enemies and oppressed with bondage, they looked for God's will, not at the hands of the priest any more, but of the prophets. These therefore actually judged Israel; but

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thou comest into thy kingdom: and St. Paul (Ephes. 5. 5): For this know ye, that no whoremonger, &c. shall enter into the kingdom of God, and of Christ: and elsewhere (2 Tim. 4. 1): I charge thee before God, and the lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and dead at his appearing, and his kingdom, &c. (verse 18): And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil work, and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom. Nor is it to be marveled at, that the same kingdom is attributed to them both; since both the Father and the Son are the same God; and the new covenant concerning God's kingdom, is not propounded in the name of the FATHER; but in the name of the FATHER, of the SON, and of the HOLY GHOST, as of one God.

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fear him who can cast both soul and body into hell (Matth. 10. 28). Neither is any man so mad, as not to choose to yield obedience rather to them who can remit and retain their sins, than to the powerfulest kings. Nor yet on the other side it is s to be imagined, that remission of sins is nothing else but an exemption from ecclesiastical punishments. For what evil hath excommunication in it, beside the eternal pains which are consequent to it? Or what benefit is it to be received into the Church, if there were salvation out of it? We must therefore hold, that pastors have power truly and absolutely to forgive sins; but to the penitent: and to retain them; but of the impenitent. But while men think that to repent, is nothing else, but that

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all questions concerning God and religion, belongs not to any foreign person whatsoever; we must consider, first, what esteem bb such a power carries cc in the minds of the subjects,dd and their civil actions.ee For no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of men, by a natural necessity, do follow those opinions which they have concerning good and evil, reward and punishment. Whence it happens, that necessarily they would choose rather to obey those, by whose judgment they believe that they shall be eternally happy or miserable. Now, by whose judgment it is appointed what doctrines are necessary to salvation, by their judgment do men expect their eternal bliss or perdition; they will therefore yield them obedience in all things. Which

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can be no society, do yet desire it.

2 The mutual fear.] It is objected: it is so improbable that men should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid, they would not have endured each other's looks. They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted. I comprehend in this word fear, a certain foresight of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. They who go to sleep, shut their doors; they who travel, carry their swords with them, because they fear thieves. Kingdoms guard their coasts and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls; and all for fear of

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with the French clergy.

Do you know that ever he sought any benefit either from Oliver, or from any of his party, or was any way familiar with any of his ministers, before or after his return; or curried favour with any of them, as you did by dedicating a book to his vice-chancellor, Owen?

Did you ever hear that he took anything done to him by his Majesty in evil part, or spake of him otherwise than the best of his servants would do; or that he was sullen, silent, or sparing, in praising his Majesty in any company, upon any occasion?

He knew who were his enemies, and upon what ground they misconstrued his writings.

But your indiscretion appears more manifestly in giving him occasion to repeat what you have done, and to consider you,

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doctrine, and to preach it, but there? Where therefore should preachers learn to teach loyalty, but there? And if your principles produced civil war, must not the contrary principles, which are his, produce peace? And consequently his book, as far as it handles civil doctrine, deserves to be taught there. But when can this be done? When you shall have no longer an army ready to maintain the evil doctrine wherewith you have infected the people. By a ready army, I mean arms, and money, and men enough, though not yet in pay, and put under officers, yet gathered together in one place or city, to be put under officers, armed, and paid on any sudden occasion; such as are the people of a great and populous town. Every great city is as a standing army, which if it be not under the

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they laugh. Of the second kind, where the disproportion is between the poet and the persons of his poem, one is in the dialect of the inferior sort of people, which is always different from the language of the court. Another is, to derive the illustration of any thing from such metaphors or comparisons as cannot come into men's thoughts, but by mean conversation, and experience of humble or evil arts, which the person of an epic poem cannot be thought acquainted with.

From knowing much, proceedeth the admirable variety and novelty of metaphors and similitudes, which are not possible to be lighted on in the compass of a narrow knowledge. And the want whereof compelleth a writer to expressions that are either defaced by time, or sullied with vulgar or

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it was made. But I pray tell me, to what end were statute laws ordained, seeing the law of reason ought to be applied to every controversy that can arise.

L. You are not ignorant of the force of an irregular appetite to riches, to power, and to sensual pleasures, how it masters the strongest reason, and is the root of disobedience, slaughter, fraud, hypocrisy, and all manner of evil habits; and that the laws of man, though they can punish the fruits of them, which are evil actions, yet they cannot pluck up the roots that are in the heart. How can a man be indicted of avarice, envy, hypocrisy, or other vicious habit, till it be declared by some action which a witness may take notice of? The root remaining, new fruit will come forth, till you be weary of punishing, and

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reason ought to be applied to every controversy that can arise.

L. You are not ignorant of the force of an irregular appetite to riches, to power, and to sensual pleasures, how it masters the strongest reason, and is the root of disobedience, slaughter, fraud, hypocrisy, and all manner of evil habits; and that the laws of man, though they can punish the fruits of them, which are evil actions, yet they cannot pluck up the roots that are in the heart. How can a man be indicted of avarice, envy, hypocrisy, or other vicious habit, till it be declared by some action which a witness may take notice of? The root remaining, new fruit will come forth, till you be weary of punishing, and at last destroy all power that shall oppose it.

P. What hope then is there of a

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former principles, whom neither the calamities of the civil wars, nor their former pardon, have thoroughly cured of their madness.

P. The common people never take notice of what they hear of this nature, but when they are set on by such as they think wise; that is, by some sorts of preachers, or some that seem to be learned in the laws, and withal speak evil of the governors. But what if the King, upon the sight or apprehension of any great danger to his people, (as when their neighbours are borne down by the current of a conquering enemy), should think his own people might be involved in the same misery; may he not levy, pay, and transport soldiers to help those weak neighbours, by way of prevention to save his own people and himself from

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had no authority in England, should have been burnt at a stake; but for saying the same in the time of Queen Elizabeth, should have been commended. You see by this, that many things are made crimes, and no crime, which are not so in their own nature, but by diversity of law, made upon diversity of opinion or of interest by them which have authority: and yet those things, whether good or evil, will pass so with the vulgar, if they hear them often with odious terms recited, for heinous crimes in themselves, as many of those opinions, which are in themselves pious and lawful, were heretofore, by the Pope's interest therein, called detestable heresy. Again, some controversies are of things done upon the sea, others of things done upon the land. There need be many courts to the

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of their lands among so many several persons. 4. The multitude of informers. 5. The number of concealers. 6. The multitude of attorneys.

P. I see Sir Edward Coke has no mind to lay any fault upon the men of his own profession, and that he assigns for causes of the mischiefs, such things as would be mischief and wickedness to amend. For if peace and plenty be the cause of this evil, it cannot be removed but by war and beggary; and the quarrels arising about the lands of religious persons cannot arise from the lands, but from the doubtfulness of the laws. And for informers, they were authorized by statutes; to the execution of which statutes they are so necessary, as that their number cannot be too great; and if it be too great, the fault is in the law itself. The

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person, or in his presence, is still robbery. But if it be taken secretly, whether it be by day or night, from his person, or from his fold, or from his pasture, then it is called theft. It is force and fraud only, that distinguisheth between theft and robbery; both which are, by the pravity only of the intention, felony in their nature. But there be so many evasions of the law found out by evil men, that I know not, in this predicament of felony, how to place them. For suppose I go secretly, by day or night, into another man's field of wheat, ripe and standing, and loading my cart with it I carry it away: is it theft or robbery?

L. Neither, it is but trespass. But if you first lay down the wheat you have cut, and then throw it into your cart, and carry it away, then

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P. The principal thing to be considered, which is the heresy itself, he leaveth out, viz. what it is; in what fact or words it consisteth; what law it violateth, statute-law or the law of reason. The cause why he omitteth it, may perhaps be this; that it was not only out of his profession, but also out of his other learning. Murder, robbery, theft, &c. every man knoweth to be evil, and are crimes defined by the statute-law, so that any man may avoid them, if he will. But who can be sure to avoid heresy, (if he but dare to give an account of his faith), unless he know beforehand what it is?

L. In the preamble of the statute of 2 Hen. IV, c. 15, heresy is laid down, as a preaching or writing of such doctrine as is contrary to

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and easy to be had. Wherein you will find, that in and a little before the time of Alexander the Great, there lived in Greece many excellent wits, that employed their time in search of the truth in all manner of sciences worthy of their labour, and which to their great honour and applause published their writings; some concerning justice, laws, and government, some concerning good and evil manners, some concerning the causes of things natural and of events discernible by sense, and some of all these subjects. And of the authors of these, the principal were Pythagoras, Plato, Zeno, Epicurus and Aristotle, men of deep and laborious meditation, and such as did not get their bread by their philosophy, but were able to live of their own, and were in honour with princes and other

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it in as a plea of the crown in the time of Queen Elizabeth; whereas in her time there was no doctrine heresy. But Justice Stamford leaves it out, because, when heresy was a crime, it was a plea of the mitre. I see also in this catalogue of causes criminal, he inserteth costly feeding, costly apparel, and costly building, though they were contrary to no statute. It is true, that by evil circumstances they become sins; but these sins belong to the judgment of the pastors spiritual. A justice of the temporal law (seeing the intention only makes them sins) cannot judge whether they be sins or no, unless he have power to take confessions. Also he makes flattery of the King to be a crime. How could he know when one man had flattered another? He meant therefore that it was a

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has defined them, suppose the definition be both made, and made known before the offence committed. For such authority is to trump in card playing, save that in matter of government, when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps. Therefore seeing every man knoweth by his own reason what actions are against the law of reason, and knoweth what punishments are by this authority for every evil action ordained; it is manifest reason, that for breaking the known laws he should suffer the known punishments. Now the person to whom this authority of defining punishments is given, can be no other, in any place of the world, but the same person that hath the sovereign power, be it one man or one assembly of men. For it were in vain to give it to any person that had not the power of the

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a precedent law, will seem but a harsh proceeding with us, who unwillingly hear of arbitrary laws, much less of arbitrary punishments, unless we were sure that all our Kings would be as good as David. I will only ask you, by what authority the clergy may take upon them to determine or make a canon concerning the power of their own King, or to distinguish between the right of a good and an evil King.

P. It is not the clergy that make their canons to be law, but it is the King that doth it by the great seal of England; and it is the King that giveth them power to teach their doctrines, in that, that he authorized them publicly to teach and preach the doctrine of Christ and his apostles, according to the Scriptures, wherein this doctrine is perspicuously contained. But

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L. There is no such later statute, nor is it to say in commission; nor can a commission, or anything but another statute, make a thing felony that was not so before.

P. See what it is for a man to distinguish felony into several sorts, before he understands the general name of felony, what it meaneth. But that a man, for killing another man by misfortune only, without any evil purpose, should forfeit all his goods and chattels, debts and duties, is a very hard judgment, unless perhaps they were to be given to the kindred of the man slain, by way of amends for damage. But the law is not that. Is it the common-law, which is the law of reason, that justifies this judgment, or the statute-law? It cannot be called the law of reason, if the case be mere misfortune. If

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I think, if the King think in his conscience it be for the good of the commonwealth, he sinneth not in it: but I hold not that the King may pardon him without sin, if any other man be damnified by the crime committed, unless he cause reparation to be made as far as the party offending can do it. And howsoever, be it sin or not sin, there is no power in England that may resist him or speak evil of him lawfully.

L. Sir Edward Coke denies not that; and upon that ground it is that the King, he says, may pardon high-treason; for there can be no high-treason but against the King.

P. That is well; therefore he confesseth, that whatsoever the offence be, the King may pardon so much of it as is an injury to himself, and that by his own right,

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but against the King.

P. That is well; therefore he confesseth, that whatsoever the offence be, the King may pardon so much of it as is an injury to himself, and that by his own right, without breach of any law positive or natural, or of any grant, if his conscience tell him that it be not to the damage of the commonwealth; and you know that to judge of what is good or evil to the commonwealth, belongeth to the King only. Now tell me, what it is which is said to be pardoned?

L. What can it be, but only the offence? If a man hath done a murder, and be pardoned for the same, is it not the murder that is pardoned?

P. Nay, by your favour, if a man be pardoned for murder or any other offence, it is the man that is pardoned; the murder still

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faculties Chap. 2: The cause of sense Chap. 3: Of imagination and the kinds thereof Chap. 4: Of the several kinds of discursion of the mind Chap. 5: Of names, reasoning, and discourse of the tongue Chap. 6: Of knowledge, opinion, and belief b. Of the faculties motive Chap. 7: Of delight and pain; good and evil Chap. 8: Of the pleasures of the sense; of honour Chap. 9: Of the passions of the mind c. Chap. 10: Of the differences between men in their discerning faculty and the cause d. Chap. 11: What imaginations and passions men have, at the names of things supernatural e. Chap. 12: How by deliberation from passions proceed

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yy answering to the words they speak. And as they have learned themselves, so they teach posterity. Now, if we consider the power of those deceptions of sense,zz mentioned chapter 2 section 10, and also how unconstantly names have been settled, and how subject they are to equivocation, and how diversified by passion, (scarce two men agreeing what is to be called good, and what evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what temerity) and how subject men are to paralogism or fallacy in reasoning, I may in a manner conclude, that it is impossible to rectify so many errors of any one man, as must needs proceed from those causes, without beginning anew from the very first grounds of all our knowledge, sense;a1 and, instead of books, reading over orderly

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in or upon their conscience.

z so that... own knowledge of it, haec sententia quam omnes MSS. praebent, deest in edd.

aa I therefore.

bb bodies, and we call strength.

cc I am to speak in general.

CHAPTER 7.
1. Of delight, pain, love, hatred. 2. Appetite, aversion, fear. 3. Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude. 5. End, fruition. 6. Profitable, use, vain. 7. Felicity.
8. Good and evil mixed. 9. Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.

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omnes MSS. praebent, deest in edd.

aa I therefore.

bb bodies, and we call strength.

cc I am to speak in general.

CHAPTER 7.
1. Of delight, pain, love, hatred. 2. Appetite, aversion, fear. 3. Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude. 5. End, fruition. 6. Profitable, use, vain. 7. Felicity.
8. Good and evil mixed. 9. Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.

1. In the eighth section of the second chapter is shewed, how conceptions or apparitions a are nothing really, but motion in some internal substance of the head; which motion not stopping there, but proceeding to the heart, of necessity must there either help or hinder that motion b which is called vital; when it

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it displeaseth, it is called AVERSION, in respect of the displeasure present; but in respect of the displeasure expected, FEAR. So that pleasure, love, and appetite, which is also called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing.

3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, GOOD; and that EVIL which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from other f in constitution, they differ also one from g another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as {agathon aplos}, that is to say, simply good.h For even the goodness which we attribute to God i Almighty, is his goodness to us. And as we call good and

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are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing.

3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, GOOD; and that EVIL which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from other f in constitution, they differ also one from g another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as {agathon aplos}, that is to say, simply good.h For even the goodness which we attribute to God i Almighty, is his goodness to us. And as we call good and evil the things that please and displease; so call we goodness and badness, the qualities or powers whereby they do it. And the signs of that goodness are called by the Latins in one word

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which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from other f in constitution, they differ also one from g another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as {agathon aplos}, that is to say, simply good.h For even the goodness which we attribute to God i Almighty, is his goodness to us. And as we call good and evil the things that please and displease; so call we goodness and badness, the qualities or powers whereby they do it. And the signs of that goodness are called by the Latins in one word PULCHRITUDO, and the signs of evil, TURPITUDO; to which we have no words precisely answerable.

4.j As all conceptions we have immediately by the sense, are delight, or pain, or appetite, or fear;

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as {agathon aplos}, that is to say, simply good.h For even the goodness which we attribute to God i Almighty, is his goodness to us. And as we call good and evil the things that please and displease; so call we goodness and badness, the qualities or powers whereby they do it. And the signs of that goodness are called by the Latins in one word PULCHRITUDO, and the signs of evil, TURPITUDO; to which we have no words precisely answerable.

4.j As all conceptions we have immediately by the sense, are delight, or pain, or appetite, or fear; so are also the k imaginations after sense. But as they are weaker imaginations, so are they also weaker pleasures, or weaker pain.

5.l As appetite is the beginning of animal motion toward something

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must find diversion and recreation of their thoughts in the contention either of play, or business. And men justly complain as of a great v grief, that they know not what to do. FELICITY, therefore (by which we mean continual delight), consisteth not in having prospered, but in prospering.

8. There are few things in this world, but either have a mixture w of good and evil, or there is a chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other, as for example: the pleasures of sin, and the bitterness of punishment, are inseparable; as are also labour x and honour, for the most part. Now when in the whole chain, the greater part is good, the whole is called good; and when the evil over-weigheth, the whole is called

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have a mixture w of good and evil, or there is a chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other, as for example: the pleasures of sin, and the bitterness of punishment, are inseparable; as are also labour x and honour, for the most part. Now when in the whole chain, the greater part is good, the whole is called good; and when the evil over-weigheth, the whole is called evil.

9. There are two sorts of pleasure, whereof the one seemeth to affect the corporeal organ of sense,y and that I call SENSUAL; the greatest whereof z is that, by which we are invited to give continuance to our species; and the next, by which a man is invited to meat, for the preservation of his individual

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or there is a chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other, as for example: the pleasures of sin, and the bitterness of punishment, are inseparable; as are also labour x and honour, for the most part. Now when in the whole chain, the greater part is good, the whole is called good; and when the evil over-weigheth, the whole is called evil.

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as appeareth by this experience which every man hath, that the same smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from ourselves; but when we think they proceed from ourselves, they displease not, though they come from others: the displeasure therefore, in these is a conception of hurt thereby as k being unwholesome, and is therefore a conception of evil to come, and not present. Concerning the delight of hearing, it is diverse, and the organ itself not affected thereby. Simple sounds please by continuance and equality,l as the sound of a bell or lute: insomuch that m it seemeth an equality continued by the percussion of the object upon the ear, is pleasure; the contrary is called harshness: such as is grating, and some other

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more wary for the time to come. This passion, as it is a sign of infirmity, which is dishonour; so also it is a sign of knowledge, which is honour. The sign of it is blushing, which happeneth l less in men conscious of their own defects, because they less betray the infirmities they acknowledge.

4. COURAGE, in a large signification, is the absence of fear in the presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a stricter m and more common meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a man in the way to his end.

5. ANGER (or sudden courage) is nothing but the appetite or desire of overcoming present opposition. It hath been commonly defined n to be grief proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted by the often experience we

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anger by things inanimate and without sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.

6. REVENGEFULNESS is that passion which ariseth from an expectation or imagination of making him that hath hurt us, to find p his own action hurtful to himself, and to acknowledge the same; and this is the height of revenge. For though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make one's adversary displeased with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity and subjection q of an enemy; which was well expressed in the exclamation of Tiberius Caesar, concerning one, that, to frustrate his revenge, had killed himself in

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things inanimate and without sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.

6. REVENGEFULNESS is that passion which ariseth from an expectation or imagination of making him that hath hurt us, to find p his own action hurtful to himself, and to acknowledge the same; and this is the height of revenge. For though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make one's adversary displeased with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity and subjection q of an enemy; which was well expressed in the exclamation of Tiberius Caesar, concerning one, that, to frustrate his revenge, had killed himself in prison: Hath

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And consequently, the passion of repentance is compounded and allayed of both, but the predominant is joy, else were the whole grief; which cannot be. For as much as he that proceedeth towards the end, conceiveth good, he proceedeth u with appetite. And appetite is joy, as hath been said, chap. 7, sect. 3.

8. HOPE is expectation of good to come, as fear is the expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working in our minds:v if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than those that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if contrarily, the whole is fear. Absolute privation of hope is DESPAIR, a degree whereof is DIFFIDENCE.

9. TRUST

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is joy, else were the whole grief; which cannot be. For as much as he that proceedeth towards the end, conceiveth good, he proceedeth u with appetite. And appetite is joy, as hath been said, chap. 7, sect. 3.

8. HOPE is expectation of good to come, as fear is the expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working in our minds:v if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than those that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if contrarily, the whole is fear. Absolute privation of hope is DESPAIR, a degree whereof is DIFFIDENCE.

9. TRUST is a passion proceeding from belief w of him from whom we expect or hope for good,

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proceedeth u with appetite. And appetite is joy, as hath been said, chap. 7, sect. 3.

8. HOPE is expectation of good to come, as fear is the expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working in our minds:v if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than those that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if contrarily, the whole is fear. Absolute privation of hope is DESPAIR, a degree whereof is DIFFIDENCE.

9. TRUST is a passion proceeding from belief w of him from whom we expect or hope for good, so free from doubt that upon the same we pursue no other way. And distrust,x or diffidence, is doubt that maketh him

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that the first will not hold.

10. PITY is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's present y calamity; but when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is the greater,z because then there appeareth the more probability aa that the same may happen to us. For the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence also it is,bb that men pity the vices of some they

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but as a signification of our reverence, who desire p to abstract from him all corporeal grossness.

5. Concerning other spirits,q which some men call spirits incorporeal, and some corporeal, it is not possible, by natural means only, to come to knowledge of so much, as that there are such things. We who are Christians acknowledge that there be angels good and evil; and that they are spirits, and that the soul of man is a spirit; and that these r spirits are immortal. But, to know it, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same: it is impossible. For all evidence is conception, as it is said chap. 6, sect. 3; and all conception is imagination and proceedeth from sense: chap. 3, sect. 1. And spirits we suppose to be those substances

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the operation of spirits in us, the knowledge we have ee must all proceed from Scripture. The signs there set down of inspiration, are miracles, when they be great, and manifestly above the power of men to do by imposture. As for example: the inspiration of Elias was known by the miraculous burning of his sacrifice.ff But the signs to distinguish whether a spirit be good or evil, are the same by which we distinguish whether a man or a tree be good or evil: namely actions and fruit. For there be lying spirits wherewith men are inspired sometimes, as well as with spirits of truth. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the spirits by their doctrine, and not of the doctrine by the spirits. For miracles, our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our faith by them,

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from Scripture. The signs there set down of inspiration, are miracles, when they be great, and manifestly above the power of men to do by imposture. As for example: the inspiration of Elias was known by the miraculous burning of his sacrifice.ff But the signs to distinguish whether a spirit be good or evil, are the same by which we distinguish whether a man or a tree be good or evil: namely actions and fruit. For there be lying spirits wherewith men are inspired sometimes, as well as with spirits of truth. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the spirits by their doctrine, and not of the doctrine by the spirits. For miracles, our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our faith by them, Matt. 24, 24. And Saint Paul saith, Gal. 1, 8: Though an angel from heaven

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God: every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God; verse 3:gg And every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is the spirit of Antichrist; verse 15: Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God. The knowledge therefore we have of good and evil inspiration, cometh not by vision of an angel that may teach it, nor by a miracle that may seem to confirm it; but by conformity of doctrine with this article and fundamental point of Christian faith, which also Saint Paul saith 1 Cor. 3, 11, is the sole foundation: that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh.

8. But if inspiration be discerned by this point; and

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aid. 8. Union. 9. Intention.b

1. It hath been declared already, how external objects cause conceptions, and conceptions appetite and fear, which are the first unperceived beginnings of our actions: for either the action immediately followeth c the first appetite, as when we do any thing upon a sudden; or else to our first appetite there succeedeth some conception of evil to happen unto us by such actions, which is fear, and withholdeth us d from proceeding. And to that fear may succeed a new appetite, and to that appetite another fear, alternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate appetite and fear ceaseth. This alternate succession of appetite and fear, during all the time

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to do or not to do: and deliberation signifieth the taking e away of our own liberty.

2. Deliberation therefore requireth in the action deliberated two conditions: one, that it be future; the other, that there be hope of doing it, or possibility of not doing it. For appetite and fear are expectations of the future; and there is no expectation of good without hope; nor of evil f without possibility. Of necessaries therefore there is no deliberation. In deliberation the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called WILL (viz.) the last appetite will to do; the last fear will not to do,g or will to omit. It is all one therefore to say will and last will: for though a man express his present inclination and appetite concerning the disposing of his

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involuntary, but the hardness of the choice, which is not his action, but the action of the winds; what he himself doth, is no more against his will, than to fly from danger is against the will of him that seeth no other means to preserve himself.

4. Voluntary also are the actions that proceed from sudden anger, or other sudden appetite, in such men as can discern of good and evil;m for in them the time precedent is to be judged deliberation. For then also he deliberateth in what cases it is good to strike, deride, or do any other action proceeding from anger or other such sudden passion.

5. Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions are not called voluntary; for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary. For a man

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as they may be by diversion to other r business, or by sleep, the last appetite of such part of the deliberation is called INTENTION, or purpose.

a Argum. desideratur.

b 9. Intention or purpose C.

c actions... follow.

d and which holdeth us.

e signifieth a taking.

f or of evil.

g Verba the last fear will not to do desunt.

h words or writings, ib. be counted.

i still liberty.

j or mixed voluntary; involuntary such as he doth. Reliqua omnia desunt.

k carried to prison, going is voluntary, to the prison, is involuntary. Item reliqua desunt.

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the last fear will not to do desunt.

h words or writings, ib. be counted.

i still liberty.

j or mixed voluntary; involuntary such as he doth. Reliqua omnia desunt.

k carried to prison, going is voluntary, to the prison, is involuntary. Item reliqua desunt.

l nothing therein.

m discern good or evil.

n the cause of appetite and fear is the cause.

o concur to one... action and effect.

p resistant.

q one of another.

r of other edd. C.

CHAPTER 13.

a 1, 2. Of teaching, persuading, controversy, consent. 3. Difference between teaching and persuading. 4.

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learned, and with passion press to have their opinions pass everywhere for truth, without any evident demonstration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation.

5. The expression of those conceptions which cause in us the expectation of y good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our expectation of evil, is that which we call COUNSELLING. And as in the internal deliberation of the mind concerning what we ourselves are to do, or not to do,z the consequences of the action are our counsellors, by alternate succession in the mind; so aa in the counsel which a man taketh from other men, the counsellors alternately do make appear the consequences of the action, and do not any of

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himself.

6. Another use of speech is the bb expression of appetite, intention, and will; as the appetite of knowledge by interrogation; appetite to have a thing done by another, as request, prayer, petition; expressions of our purpose or intention, as PROMISE, which is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in the future; THREATENING, which is the promise of evil; and COMMANDING, which is that speech by which we signify to another our appetite or desire to have any thing done, or left undone, for reason contained in the will itself: for it is not properly said, Sic volo, sic jubeo, without that other clause, Stet pro ratione voluntas: and when the command is a sufficient reason to move us to the action,cc then is that command

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who shall judge which nations are the wisest. Others make that against the law of nature, which is contrary to the consent of all mankind; which definition cannot be allowed, because then no man could offend against the law of nature; for the nature of every man is contained under the nature of mankind. But forasmuch as all men, carried away a by the violence of their passion, and by evil customs, do those things which are commonly said to be against the law of nature; it is not the consent of passion,b or consent in some error gotten by custom, that makes the law of nature. Reason is no less of the nature of man than passion, and is the same in all men, because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain,

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he only breaketh them that doth any action contrary, but also he whose action is conformable to them, in case he think it contrary. For though the action chance to be right, yet in his judgment he despiseth the law.

14. Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like manner that which displeaseth him evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation (which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at) must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason; and the breaking of them evil. And so also the habit, or

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be right, yet in his judgment he despiseth the law.

14. Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like manner that which displeaseth him evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation (which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at) must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason; and the breaking of them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to fulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence cometh that distinction of malum poenae, and malum culpae; for

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despiseth the law.

14. Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like manner that which displeaseth him evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation (which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at) must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason; and the breaking of them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to fulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence cometh that distinction of malum poenae, and malum culpae; for malum poenae is any pain or

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that which displeaseth him evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation (which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at) must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason; and the breaking of them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to fulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence cometh that distinction of malum poenae, and malum culpae; for malum poenae is any pain or molestation of mind l whatsoever; but malum culpae is that action which is contrary to reason and the law of nature; as also the habit of doing

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(which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at) must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason; and the breaking of them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to fulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence cometh that distinction of malum poenae, and malum culpae; for malum poenae is any pain or molestation of mind l whatsoever; but malum culpae is that action which is contrary to reason and the law of nature; as also the habit of doing according to these and other laws of nature that tend to our preservation, is that we call VIRTUE; and the

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the Pharisee. And Christ saith: His yoke is easy, and his burthen d light; which proceeded e from this, that Christ required no more than our best endeavour. And Rom. 14, 23: He that doubteth, is condemned, if he eat. And in innumerable places both in the Old and New Testament, God Almighty declareth, that he taketh the will for the deed, both in good and evil actions. By all which it plainly appears, that the divine law is dictated to the conscience. On the other side it is no less plain: that how many and how f heinous actions soever a man commit through infirmity, he shall nevertheless, whensoever he shall condemn the same in his own conscience, be freed from the punishments that to such actions otherwise belong. For, At what time

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passions of one man alone, it will follow, that the inconvenience arising from passion i will be greater in an aristocracy, than a monarchy. But there is no doubt, when things are debated in great assemblies, but every man delivering his opinion at large, without interruption, endeavoureth to make whatsoever he is to set forth for good, better; and what he would have apprehended as evil, worse, as much as is possible; to the end his counsel may take place; which counsel also is never without aim at his own benefit, or honour: every man's end being some good to himself. Now this cannot be done without working upon the j passions of the rest. And thus the passions of those that are singly moderate, are altogether vehement; even as a great many coals, though but warm

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they be subject to principalities and powers. 1 Peter 2, 3, 13-14: Submit yourselves unto all manner of ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be unto the king, as unto the superior, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent of him for the punishment of evil-doers. Jude, verse 8: These dreamers also that defile the flesh, and despise government, and speak evil of them that are in authority. And forasmuch as all subjects in commonwealths are in the nature of children and servants, that which is a command to them, is a command to all subjects. But to these St. Paul saith, Colos. 3, 20, 22: Children, obey your parents in all things; servants, be obedient to your masters according to the flesh, in all things. And verse 23: Do it

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be done or not done, this will follow; or imperative, as Do this, or do it not. In the first sort of these expressions, consisteth the nature of a covenant; in the second, consisteth counsel; in the third, command.

2. It is evident, when a man doth, or forbeareth to do any action, if he be moved thereto by this only consideration, that the same is good or evil in itself; and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another should be of any weight in his deliberation, that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated, is any breach of law. And consequently, whatsoever is a law to a man, respecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a covenant is the declaration b of a man's own will. And therefore a law

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heresies of the primitive church, were about the Trinity. For, according to the usual curiosity of natural philosophers, they could not abstain from disputing the very first principles of Christianity, into which they were baptized, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Some there were that made them allegorical. Others would make one creator of good, and another of evil; which was in effect to set up two Gods, one contrary to another; supposing that causation of evil could not be attributed to God, without impiety. From which doctrine they are not far distant, that now make the first cause of sinful actions to be every man as to his own sin. Others there were, that would have God to be a body with parts organical, as face, hands, fore-parts, and

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philosophers, they could not abstain from disputing the very first principles of Christianity, into which they were baptized, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Some there were that made them allegorical. Others would make one creator of good, and another of evil; which was in effect to set up two Gods, one contrary to another; supposing that causation of evil could not be attributed to God, without impiety. From which doctrine they are not far distant, that now make the first cause of sinful actions to be every man as to his own sin. Others there were, that would have God to be a body with parts organical, as face, hands, fore-parts, and back-parts. Others, that Christ had no real body, but was a mere phantasm: for phantasms were taken then, and

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legible only to him that searcheth hearts. And though by men's actions we do discover their design sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man.

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly,

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confuted, to keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt, but God can make unnatural apparitions: But that he does it so often, as men need to fear such things, more than they fear the stay, or change, of the course of nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evil men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it, prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things

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And this ought to be the work of the schools: but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what imagination, or the senses are), what they receive, they teach: some saying, that imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause; others, that they rise most commonly from the will; and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts by the Devil; or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing

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nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what imagination, or the senses are), what they receive, they teach: some saying, that imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause; others, that they rise most commonly from the will; and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts by the Devil; or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.

The imagination that is raised in man (or any other

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the use of reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends; but specially according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought conjuring: but for other sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings and some progress in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no

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continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth;) or, (in a

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same appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth;) or, (in a commonwealth,) from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men

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object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth;) or, (in a commonwealth,) from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and

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to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth;) or, (in a commonwealth,) from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum and turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for pulchrum we say in some things, fair; in others, beautiful, or handsome, or

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or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum and turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for pulchrum we say in some things, fair; in others, beautiful, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable; and for turpe, foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper

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in some things, fair; in others, beautiful, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable; and for turpe, foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the mine,a or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil

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require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the mine,a or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtful.

As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, (as I have said before,) only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and

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which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the mine,a or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtful.

As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, (as I have said before,) only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and colour; to the

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else but the mine,a or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtful.

As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, (as I have said before,) only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, &c.: so, when

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evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtful.

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and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called jucunda, (a juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.

Pleasure therefore, (or delight,) is the apparence, or sense of good; and molestation or displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion, with more or less displeasure and offence.

Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called pleasuresb of sense, (the word sensual, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having

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for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joined with endeavour to supplant, or hinder a competitor, ENVY.

When in the mind of man, appetites, and aversions, hopes, and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it; sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able to do it; sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call

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but certain signs they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

And because in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent, or seeming good. And

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they that use them, have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

And because in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent, or seeming good. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent, or

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in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent, or seeming good. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent, or seeming evil: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

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sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent, or seeming good. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent, or seeming evil: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say,

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thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent, or seeming good. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is apparent, or seeming evil: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the felicity

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that the thing will be, and will not be, or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been. All which is opinion. And that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil; the same is alternate opinion, in the enquiry of the truth of past, and future. And as the last appetite in deliberation, is called the will; so the last opinion in search of the truth of past, and future, is called the JUDGMENT, or resolute and final sentence of him that discourseth. And as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question

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of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act, for any man to speak against his conscience: or to corrupt or force another so to do: insomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said, that the conscience is a thousand

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and to have passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESS, and distraction; and to have stronger and more vehement passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESS.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion, proceedeth from the evil constitution of the organs of the body, or harm done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the passion. But in both cases the madness is of one and the same nature.

The passion, whose violence, or continuance, maketh madness, is either great vain-glory; which is commonly called pride, and

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and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. In sum, all passions that produce strange and unusual behaviour, are called by the general name of madness. But of the several kinds of madness, he that would take the pains, might enrol a legion. And if the excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when they tend to evil, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible always in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such passion; yet when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of madness can there be

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so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves, as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that madness is nothing else, but too much appearing passion, may be gathered out of the effects of wine, which are the same with those of the evil disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of madmen: some of them raging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their several domineering passions: for the effect of the wine, does but remove dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deformity of their passions. For, (I believe) the

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a prophet, said, these are not the words of one that hath a devil. So in the old Testament he that came to anoint Jehu, 2 Kings 9. 11. was a prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, what came that madman for? So that in sum, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himself in extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jews to be possessed either with a good, or evil spirit; except by the Sadducees, who erred so far on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very near to direct atheism;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to term such men demoniacs, rather than madmen.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possessed; and not as if they were

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disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that unjust which it hath been the custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an example, or (as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it) a precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners, but the correction they receive from their parents and masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas, men are not so; because grown strong,e and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is

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is also only in man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other b living creatures.

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man, to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune.

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

Thirdly, whereas there is no other felicity of beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian food, ease, and lusts; as having little or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and

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quotidian food, ease, and lusts; as having little or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see; man observeth how one event hath been produced by another; and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the c authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself.

The two first, make anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is

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as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the c authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself.

The two first, make anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come; so that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate d like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, the prudent man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an eagle feeding on

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hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some power, or agent invisible: in which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old poets said, that the gods were at first created by human fear: which spoken of the gods, (that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to

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call causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by, but by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event, any dependence or connexion at all: and therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: as the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to

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swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

Lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from other men, of whom they have once conceived

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fairies and bugbears. They have also ascribed divinity, and built temples to meer accidents, and qualities; such as are time, night, day, peace, concord, love, contention, virtue, honour, health, rust, fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that good, or evil, for, or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own wit, by the name of Muses; their own ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own lust,g by the name of Cupid; their own rage, by the name Furies;h their own privy members, by the name of Priapus, and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae: insomuch as

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or hath so renounced, or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only; or (as it happeneth most often) both words, and actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and obliged: bonds, that have their strength, not from their own nature, (for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word,) but from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture.

Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights, which

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(the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to execution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law, by which they are condemned.

A covenant to accuse one self, without

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that repenting, desire it. For PARDON, is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear; yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an aversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature.

A seventh is, that in revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon, upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the

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desire it. For PARDON, is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear; yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an aversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature.

A seventh is, that in revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon, upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example, and

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granting of peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear; yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an aversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature.

A seventh is, that in revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon, upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the

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I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the law, is just.

And the science of them, is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good, and evil, in the conversation, and society of mankind. Good, and evil, are names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different: and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or

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in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the law, is just.

And the science of them, is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good, and evil, in the conversation, and society of mankind. Good, and evil, are names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different: and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in

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and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil: from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long a e man is in the condition of mere nature, (which is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good, and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace, which, (as I have shewed before) are justice, gratitude,

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actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil: from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long a e man is in the condition of mere nature, (which is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good, and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace, which, (as I have shewed before) are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature, are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice, is moral philosophy; and therefore

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is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good, and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means of peace, which, (as I have shewed before) are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature, are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice, is moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral philosophy. But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices; yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness; nor that they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a

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the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury, and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most

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and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

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it into distraction and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury, and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and control the

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this is it men call propriety. For before constitution of sovereign power (as hath already been shown) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth war: and therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace, and depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety (or meum and tuum) and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects, are the civil laws; that is to say, the laws of each commonwealth in particular; though the name of civil law be now restrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the world, her laws at that time were in these parts the civil law.

Eighthly, is annexed to the

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a civil war.

Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great and inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the sovereign power is in an assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a monarch by flatterers; and becoming one another's flatterers, serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns. And whereas the favourites of monarchs, are few, and they have none else to advance but their own kindred; the favourites of an assembly, are many; and the kindred much more numerous, than of any monarch. Besides, there is no

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of sovereign assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires less eloquence (such is man's nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles justice.

Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy, that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern between good and evil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his power, must be in the hand of another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to govern by his right, and in his name; as curators, and protectors of his person, and authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the sovereign power, into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men; is to say that all government is more

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us, to conduct our wars. Here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have, both to the militia, and to all judicature; in which is contained as absolute power, as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the prayer of king Solomon to God, was this (1 Kings, 3. 9): Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between good and evil. It belongeth therefore to the sovereign to be judge, and to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil: which rules are laws; and therefore in him is the legislative power. Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying, (1 Sam. 24. 9)d God

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judicature; in which is contained as absolute power, as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the prayer of king Solomon to God, was this (1 Kings, 3. 9): Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between good and evil. It belongeth therefore to the sovereign to be judge, and to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil: which rules are laws; and therefore in him is the legislative power. Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying, (1 Sam. 24. 9)d God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anointed of God. For obedience of servants St. Paul saith;

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ask you, what you mean by it, say the Lord hath need of them: and they will let them go. They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Genesis 3. 5)g Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. And verse 11. Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat? For the cognizance or judicature of good and evil, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience; the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed

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but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Genesis 3. 5)g Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. And verse 11. Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat? For the cognizance or judicature of good and evil, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience; the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it, they should be as gods, knowing good and evil. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good

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the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat? For the cognizance or judicature of good and evil, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience; the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it, they should be as gods, knowing good and evil. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good and evil; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then

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forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as a trial of Adam's obedience; the devil to inflame the ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it, they should be as gods, knowing good and evil. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good and evil; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakedness (wherein it was God's will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed,

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their subjects to be censured, nor disputed.

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and Scripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular, and aristocratical commonwealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds from the subject's disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from which the commonwealth hath its being.

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within the dominion of another, is public there, but private.

And of private systems, some are lawful; some unlawful. Lawful, are those which are allowed by the commonwealth: all other are unlawful. Irregular systems, are those which having no representative, consist only in concourse of people; which if not forbidden by the commonwealth, nor made on evil design, (such as are conflux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end,) are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the number be considerable), unknown, they are unlawful.

In bodies politic, the power of the representative is always limited: and that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the power sovereign. For power unlimited, is

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Lawful, are those which are allowed by the commonwealth: all other are unlawful. Irregular systems, are those which having no representative, consist only in concourse of people; which if not forbidden by the commonwealth, nor made on evil design, (such as are conflux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end,) are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the number be considerable), unknown, they are unlawful.

In bodies politic, the power of the representative is always limited: and that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the power sovereign. For power unlimited, is absolute sovereignty. And the sovereign, in every commonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects; and therefore no

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leagues between commonwealths, over whom there is no human power established, to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful, but also profitable for the time they last. But leagues of the subjects of one and the same commonwealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice, and (in case the design of them be evil, or unknown to the commonwealth) unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evil intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the public, and unjustly concealed.

If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part of the assembly, without authority, consult apart, to contrive the guidance of the rest; this is a

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are not only lawful, but also profitable for the time they last. But leagues of the subjects of one and the same commonwealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice, and (in case the design of them be evil, or unknown to the commonwealth) unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evil intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the public, and unjustly concealed.

If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part of the assembly, without authority, consult apart, to contrive the guidance of the rest; this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular

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he calleth an assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning systems, and assemblies of people, which may be compared (as I said,) to the similar parts of man's body; such as be lawful, to the muscles; such as are unlawful, to wens, biles, and apostems, engendered by the unnatural conflux of evil humours.

a governments.

b Those.

c representatives.

d if private men.

e else they.

f join to.

g Acts xix. 38-40.

CHAPTER 23. OF THE PUBLIC MINISTERS OF SOVEREIGN POWER.

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is to be reputed void. It is true, that a sovereign monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the law of nature; but this is not enough to authorize any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as to accuse of injustice, or any way to speak evil of their sovereign; because they have authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the sovereign power, made them their own. But in what cases the commands of sovereigns are contrary to equity, and the law of nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place.

In the distribution of land, the commonwealth itself, may be conceived to have a portion, and possess, and improve the

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neither ask, nor take any further counsel; for the sense of the assembly, is the resolution of the debate, and end of all deliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel, is author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot, no man else can. But if one subject giveth counsel to another, to do any thing contrary to the laws, whether that counsel proceed from evil intention, or from ignorance only, it is punishable by the commonwealth; because ignorance of the law, is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject.

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is counsel, accompanied with signs in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, counsel vehemently pressed.

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he ought to propound his advice, in such form of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firm ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore rash, and unevident inferences; (such as are fetched only from examples, or authority of books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evil, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,) obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphorical speeches, tending to the stirring up of passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are useful only to deceive, or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the office of a counsellor.

Thirdly, because

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shall have a question of right grounded, not upon his present will, but upon the laws formerly made; the length of time shall bring no prejudice to his right; but the question shall be judged by equity. For many unjust actions, and unjust sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time, than any man can remember. And our lawyers account no customs law, but such as are reasonable, and that evil customs are to be abolished: But the judgment of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the law, which is the sovereign assembly, or monarch.

4. The law of nature, and the civil law, contain each other, and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral virtues on

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can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the sovereignty is placed. And it is a dictate of natural reason, and consequently an evident law of nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who is sovereign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evil men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the authority derived from him; the removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the public registers, public counsels, public ministers, and public seals; by which all laws are sufficiently verified; verified, I say, not authorized: for the verification, is but the testimony and record; not the authority of

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if the subject shall refuse to obey the command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is nevertheless a sin, and contrary to the duty of the subject: for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the sovereignty, because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof. But if he not only disobey, but also resist a public minister in the execution of it, then it is a crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the peace,) upon complaint.

The degrees of crime are taken on divers scales, and measured, first, by the malignity of the source, or cause: secondly, by the contagion of the

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sovereign, the plea is a Public Plea.

a in speaking.

b then he is.

c error is shewn.

d man.

e have omitted.

CHAPTER 28. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS.

A PUNISHMENT, is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.

Before I infer any thing from this definition, there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the right, or authority of

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of mere nature, and of war of every one against his neighbour.

From the definition of punishment, I infer, first, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be styled punishment; because they proceed not from public authority.

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the public favour, is not a punishment; because no new evil is thereby on any man inflicted; he is only left in the estate he was in before.

Thirdly, that the evil inflicted by public authority, without precedent public condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is punished, ought first to be judged by public authority, to be a transgression of the law.

Fourthly, that

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of punishment, I infer, first, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be styled punishment; because they proceed not from public authority.

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the public favour, is not a punishment; because no new evil is thereby on any man inflicted; he is only left in the estate he was in before.

Thirdly, that the evil inflicted by public authority, without precedent public condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is punished, ought first to be judged by public authority, to be a transgression of the law.

Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and judges without authority from the sovereign, is not punishment; but

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on any man inflicted; he is only left in the estate he was in before.

Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and judges without authority from the sovereign, is not punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of public authority.

Fifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention, or possibility of disposing the delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to

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is punished, ought first to be judged by public authority, to be a transgression of the law.

Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and judges without authority from the sovereign, is not punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of public authority.

Fifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention, or possibility of disposing the delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the laws, is not punishment; but an act of hostility; because without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by nature, divers hurtful consequences; as when a man in assaulting

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one that is a declared enemy, falls not under the name of punishment: because seeing they were either never subject to the law, and therefore cannot transgress it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgress it, all the harms that can be done them, must be taken as acts of hostility. But in declared hostility, all infliction of evil is lawful. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberately deny the authority of the representative of the commonwealth (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the representative will: For in denying subjection, he denies such punishment as by the law hath been ordained; and

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price of a dispensation to swear, but the punishment of the transgression of a law indispensable. In like manner if the law impose a sum of money to be paid, to him that has been injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Ignominy, is the infliction of such evil, as is made dishonourable; or the deprivation of such good, as is made honourable by the commonwealth. For there be some things honourable by nature; as the effects of courage, magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and mind: others made honourable by the commonwealth; as badges, titles, offices, or any other singular mark of the sovereign's favour. The former, (though

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of pain on a man condemned. The former is not punishment; because no man is supposed to be punished, before he be judicially heard, and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the law of nature. But the latter is punishment, because evil, and inflicted by public authority, for somewhat that has by the same authority been judged a transgression of the law. Under this word imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an external obstacle, be it a house, which is called by the general name of a prison; or an island, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to work, as in old time

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to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the commonwealth, by punishing the innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth ingratitude: For seeing all sovereign power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the punishment of the innocent, is a rendering of evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity; that is to say, an equal distribution of justice; which in punishing the innocent is not observed.

But the infliction of what evil soever, on an innocent man, that is not a subject, if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth, and without violation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men that are

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power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the punishment of the innocent, is a rendering of evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity; that is to say, an equal distribution of justice; which in punishing the innocent is not observed.

But the infliction of what evil soever, on an innocent man, that is not a subject, if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth, and without violation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men that are not subjects, are either enemies, or else they have ceased from being so by some precedent covenants. But against enemies, whom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by

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flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readiness, even at the gates of their city; such damage, or shifts, are all commonwealths forced to, that have their power never so little limited.

In the second place, I observe the diseases of a commonwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is, That every private man is judge of good and evil actions. This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also under civil government, in such cases as are not determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evil actions, is the civil law; and the judge the legislator, who is always representative of the commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to

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the diseases of a commonwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is, That every private man is judge of good and evil actions. This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also under civil government, in such cases as are not determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evil actions, is the civil law; and the judge the legislator, who is always representative of the commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the commonwealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgments they shall think fit. Whereby the commonwealth is distracted and weakened.

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of the commonwealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgments they shall think fit. Whereby the commonwealth is distracted and weakened.

Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience, and his judgment is the same thing; and as the judgment, so also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public conscience, by which he

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study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration, or infusion, which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his faith; or why every Christian should not be also a prophet; or why any man should take the law of his country, rather than his own inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus we fall again into a the fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil; or to make judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the dissolution of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to every effect,

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and in the making, and executing of good laws, to which individual persons may apply their own cases.

And because, if the essential rights of sovereignty (specified before in the eighteenth chapter) be taken away, the commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a war with every other man, (which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life;) it is the office of the sovereign, to maintain those rights entire; and consequently against his duty, first, to transfer to another, or to lay from himself any of them. For he that deserteth the means, deserteth the ends; and he deserteth the means, that being the sovereign, acknowledgeth himself subject to the civil laws; and renounceth the power of supreme

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seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not only secretly, but openly, so as to proclaim marriage with them in facie ecclesiciae by preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten commandments.

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great a fault it is, to speak evil of the sovereign representative, (whether one man, or an assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his power; or any way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people, and their obedience (in which the safety of the commonwealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third commandment by resemblance pointeth to.

Fourthly,

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the next degree (in most men,) those that concern conjugal affection; and after them riches and means of living. Therefore the people are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one another's person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugal honour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one another's goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be showed the evil consequences of false judgment, by corruption either of judges or witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments.

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not only the unjust facts, but the designs and intentions to do them, (though by

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a democracy, nor aristocracy; because the persons counselling are members of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors therefore is proper to monarchy; in which, the sovereign that endeavoureth not to make choice of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his office as he ought to do. The most able counsellors, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evil counsel, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace, and defence of the commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from public troubles; but the signs that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expenses and may

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the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and gracious; but as omnipotent. And though punishment be due for sin only, because by that word is understood affliction for sin; yet the right of afflicting, is not always derived from men's sin, but from God's power.

This question, why evil men often prosper, and good men suffer adversity, has been much disputed by the ancient, and is the same with this of ours, by what right God dispenseth the prosperities and adversities of this life; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. How

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of the brain; yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signify his will, they are not improperly termed God's messengers, that is to say, his angels.

And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the imagery of the brain, for things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy; and out of them framed their opinions of demons, good and evil; which because they seemed to subsist really, they called substances; and because they could not feel them with their hands, incorporeal: so also the Jews upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, (except the sect of the Sadducees,) that those apparitions (which it pleased God sometimes to

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that those apparitions (which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancy of men, for his own service, and therefore called them his angels) were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God; whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the angels of God, and those they thought would hurt them, they called evil angels, or evil spirits; such as was the spirit of Python, and the spirits of madmen, of lunatics, and epileptics: for they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases, demoniacs.

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where angels are mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else be understood by the word angel, but some

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those apparitions (which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancy of men, for his own service, and therefore called them his angels) were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God; whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the angels of God, and those they thought would hurt them, they called evil angels, or evil spirits; such as was the spirit of Python, and the spirits of madmen, of lunatics, and epileptics: for they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases, demoniacs.

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where angels are mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else be understood by the word angel, but some image raised

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the messengers, and ministers of his word, or works) are things permanent, and withal incorporeal. That they are permanent, may be gathered from the words of our Saviour himself, (Matt. 25. 41) where he saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels: which place is manifest for the permanence of evil angels, (unless we might think the name of Devil and his angels may be understood of the Church's adversaries and their ministers;) but then it is repugnant to their immateriality; because everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible substances, such as are all things incorporeal. Angels therefore are not thence proved to be incorporeal. In like manner where St. Paul says, (1 Cor.

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For the proper use of the word infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried hither and thither, and to be poured into men as into barrels.

In the same manner, to take inspiration in the proper sense, or to say that good spirits entered into men to make them prophecy, or evil spirits into those that became phrenetic, lunatic, or epileptic, is not to take the word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As also (Acts 2. 2) the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein the apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be understood for the Holy

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kingdom of God, and without prejudice to the sovereign.

From the very creation, God not only reigned over all men naturally by his might; but also had peculiar subjects, whom he commanded by a voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he reigned over Adam, and gave him commandment to abstain from the tree of cognizance of good and evil; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging between good and evil, not by his creator's commandment, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of eternal life, wherein God had at first created him: and afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universal deluge; and in these eight

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God not only reigned over all men naturally by his might; but also had peculiar subjects, whom he commanded by a voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he reigned over Adam, and gave him commandment to abstain from the tree of cognizance of good and evil; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging between good and evil, not by his creator's commandment, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of eternal life, wherein God had at first created him: and afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universal deluge; and in these eight did consist the then kingdom of God.

After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and

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13) concerning his being restored to his office: for there by his word was come, is meant, the thing itself was come to pass. So also (1 Kings 18. 36) Elijah saith to God, I have done all these thy words, instead of I have done all these things at thy word, or commandment: and (Jer. 17. 15) Where is the word of the Lord, is put for, Where is the evil he threatened: And (Ezek. 12. 28) There shall none of my words be prolonged any more: by words are understood those things, which God promised to his people. And in the New Testament (Matth. 24. 35) heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away; that is, there is nothing that I have promised or foretold, that shall not come

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of their oracles, intoxicated with a spirit, or vapour from the cave of the Pythian oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad, and spake like madmen; of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all bodies are said to be made of materia prima. In the d Scripture I find it also so taken (1 Sam. 18. 10) in these words, And the evil spirit came upon Saul, and he prophecied in the midst of the house.

And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him, to whom God speaketh immediately, that which the prophet is to say from him, to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be

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actions, they are to obtain eternal life.

And first we find, that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not broken the commandment of God, he had enjoyed it in the paradise of Eden everlastingly. For there was the tree of life; whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; which was not allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, (Gen. 3. 22) lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live for ever. By which it seemeth to me, (with submission nevertheless both in this, and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of

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a grief, and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others, which they themselves through their own incredulity and disobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with their own actual miseries; it followeth that they are to suffer such bodily pains, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but have also for enemy, the eternal king of the saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily pains, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second death. For though the Scripture be clear for an universal resurrection; yet we do not read, that to any of the reprobate is promised an eternal life. For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. 15. 42, 43) to

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Whereby it is evident, that there is to be a second death of every one that shall be condemned at the day of judgment, after which he shall die no more.

The joys of life eternal, are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of SALVATION, or being saved. To be saved, is to be secured, either respectively, against special evils, or absolutely, against all evil,j comprehending want, sickness, and death it self. And because man was created in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that happiness by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to be saved from sin, is to be saved from all the evil, and calamities that sin hath brought upon us.

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against special evils, or absolutely, against all evil,j comprehending want, sickness, and death it self. And because man was created in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that happiness by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to be saved from sin, is to be saved from all the evil, and calamities that sin hath brought upon us. And therefore in the holy Scripture, remission of sin, and salvation from death and misery, is the same thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man sick of the palsy, by saying, (Matth. 9. 2) Son be of good cheer, thy sins be forgiven thee; and knowing that the Scribes took for blasphemy, that a man

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sins may be pardoned to the repentant, either gratis, or upon such penalty as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted in the Old Testament, was some sacrifice, or oblation. To forgive sin is not an act of injustice, though the punishment have been threatened. Even amongst men, though the promise of good, bind the promiser; yet threats, that is to say, promises of evil, bind them not; much less shall they bind God, who is infinitely more merciful than men. Our Saviour Christ therefore to redeem us, did not in that sense satisfy for the sins of men, as that his death, of its own virtue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with eternal death; but did make that sacrifice, and oblation of himself, at his first coming, which God was pleased to

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By which is to be understood, that where it is said, there was no king, is meant, there was no sovereign power in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the act and exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua and Eleazar, there arose another generation (Judges 2. 10)f that knew not the Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel, but did evil in the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim. And the Jews had that quality which St. Paul noteth, to look for a sign, not only before they would submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission. Whereas signs, and miracles had for end to procure faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they have once given it; for

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unto the voice of the people, in all that they shall say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. Having therefore rejected God, in whose right the priests governed, there was no authority left to the priests, but such as the king was pleased to allow them; which was more or less, according as the kings were good, or evil. And for the government of civil affairs, it is manifest, it was all in the hands of the king. For in the same chapter, (verse 20) they say they will be like all the nations; that their king shall be their judge, and go before them, and fight their battles; that is, he shall have the whole authority, both in peace and war. In which is contained also the ordering of religion: for

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all power is ordained of God; and that we ought to be subject to them, not only for fear of incurring their wrath, but also for conscience sake. And St. Peter (1 Epistle 2. 13, 14, 15), Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well; for so is the will of God. And again St. Paul (Titus 3. 1), Put men in mind to be subject to principalities, and powers, and to obey magistrates. These princes, and powers, whereof St. Peter, and St. Paul here speak, were all infidels; much more therefore we are to obey those e Christians, whom God hath ordained to

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give, because they had freely received; and their maintenance was the free gift of those that believed the good tiding they carried about of the coming of the Messiah their Saviour. To which we may add, that which was contributed out of gratitude by such as our Saviour had healed of diseases; of which are mentioned (Luke 8. 2, 3) Certain women which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen, out of whom went seven devils; and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward; and Susanna, and many others, which ministered unto him of their substance.

After our Saviour's ascension, the Christians of every city lived in common (Acts 4. 34)ss upon the money which was made of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid

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remember, that the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace, and to be taught the subjects, is in all commonwealths inseparably annexed (as hath been already proved chapter
18.), to the sovereign power civil, whether it be in one man, or in one assembly of men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity, that men's actions are derived from the opinions they have of the good, or evil, which from those actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their obedience to the sovereign power, will be more hurtful to them, than their disobedience, will disobey the laws, and thereby overthrow the commonwealth, and introduce confusion, and civil war; for the avoiding whereof, all civil government was ordained. And therefore in

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Saviour and his apostles, delivered to us in the Scripture.

To prove the Pope has power to make laws, he allegeth many places; as first, Deut. 17. 12. The man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest, (that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God, or unto the judge,) even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel. For answer whereunto, we are to remember that the high priest (next and immediately under God) was the civil sovereign; and all judges were to be constituted by him. The words alleged sound therefore thus. The man that will presume to disobey the civil sovereign for the time being, or any of his officers in the execution of their places, that man shall die, &c.

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of their own subjects; and the Pope is no more but king and pastor, even in Rome itself.

The fifth argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, Feed my sheep; by which was given all power necessary for a pastor; as the power to chase away wolves, such as are heretics; the power to shut up rams, if they be mad, or push at the other sheep with their horns, such as are evil (though Christian) kings; and power to give the flock convenient food: From whence he inferreth, that St. Peter had these three powers given him by Christ. To which I answer, that the last of these powers, is no more than the power, or rather command to teach. For the first, which is to chase away wolves, that is, heretics, the place he quoteth is (Matth. 7. 15) Beware of false

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are to be justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by righteousness be understood the justice of the works themselves, there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the law of God. And therefore when we are said to be justified by works, it is to be understood of the will, which God doth always accept for the work itself, as well in good, as in evil men. And in this sense only it is, that a man is called just, or unjust; and that his justice justifies him, that is, gives him the title, in God's acceptation, of just; and renders him capable of living by his faith, which before he was not. So that justice justifies in that sense, in which to justify, is the same that i to denominate a man

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torments: And yet I can find no where that any man shall live in torments everlastingly. Also, it seemeth hard, to say, that God who is the father of mercies, that doth in heaven and earth all that he will; that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing; that worketh in men both to do, and to will; and without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good, nor repentance of evil, should punish men's transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture, that men can imagine, and more. We are therefore to consider, what the meaning is, of everlasting fire, and other the like phrases of Scripture.

I have showed already, that the kingdom of God by Christ beginneth at the day of judgment: that in that day the

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do them good or harm; and consequently, given occasion to the governors of the heathen commonwealths to regulate this their fear, by establishing that DEMONOLOGY (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion, were specially employed or reverenced) to the public peace, and to the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some of them good demons, and others evil; the one as a spur to the observance, the other, as reins to withhold them from violation of the laws.

What kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of demons, appeareth partly in the genealogy of their gods, written by Hesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the Grecians; and partly in other histories; of which I have observed some few

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Asia, Egypt, and Italy; and therein, by necessary consequence their demonology, or (as St. Paul calls it)a their doctrines of devils: And by that means, the contagion was derived also to the Jews, both of Judea and Alexandria, and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of demon they did not (as the Grecians) attribute to spirits both good and evil; but to the evil only: and to the good demons they gave the name of the spirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entered to be prophets. In sum, all singularity if good, they attributed to the spirit of God; and if evil, to some demon, but a {kakodaimon}, an evil demon, that is, a devil. And therefore, they called demoniacs, that is, possessed

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and therein, by necessary consequence their demonology, or (as St. Paul calls it)a their doctrines of devils: And by that means, the contagion was derived also to the Jews, both of Judea and Alexandria, and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of demon they did not (as the Grecians) attribute to spirits both good and evil; but to the evil only: and to the good demons they gave the name of the spirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entered to be prophets. In sum, all singularity if good, they attributed to the spirit of God; and if evil, to some demon, but a {kakodaimon}, an evil demon, that is, a devil. And therefore, they called demoniacs, that is, possessed by the devil,

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and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of demon they did not (as the Grecians) attribute to spirits both good and evil; but to the evil only: and to the good demons they gave the name of the spirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entered to be prophets. In sum, all singularity if good, they attributed to the spirit of God; and if evil, to some demon, but a {kakodaimon}, an evil demon, that is, a devil. And therefore, they called demoniacs, that is, possessed by the devil, such as we call madmen or lunatics; or such as had the falling sickness, or that spoke any thing which they, for want of understanding, thought absurd. As also of an unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to say he

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dispersed. But the name of demon they did not (as the Grecians) attribute to spirits both good and evil; but to the evil only: and to the good demons they gave the name of the spirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entered to be prophets. In sum, all singularity if good, they attributed to the spirit of God; and if evil, to some demon, but a {kakodaimon}, an evil demon, that is, a devil. And therefore, they called demoniacs, that is, possessed by the devil, such as we call madmen or lunatics; or such as had the falling sickness, or that spoke any thing which they, for want of understanding, thought absurd. As also of an unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to say he had an unclean spirit; of a dumb man, that he

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inventions. If we require of the Scripture an account of all questions, which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of God's commands; we may as well complain of Moses for not having set down the time of the creation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth and sea, and of men and beasts. To conclude, I find in Scripture that there be angels, and spirits, good and evil; but not that they are incorporeal, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream, or vision; which the Latins call spectra, and took for demons. And I find that there are spirits corporeal, (though subtle and invisible) but not that any man's body was possessed or inhabited by them; and that the bodies of the saints shall be such, namely, spiritual bodies, as St.

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known, without the knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines and figures. Their moral philosophy is but a description of their own passions. For the rule of manners, without civil government, is the law of nature; and in it, the law civil, that determineth what is honest and dishonest; what is just and unjust; and generally what is good and evil. Whereas they make the rules of good and bad, by their own liking and disliking: by which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of commonwealth. Their logic, which should be the method of reasoning, is nothing else

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the rest of the body, feeling.

For cause of the will, to do any particular action, which is called volitio, they assign the faculty, that is to say, the capacity in general, that men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is called voluntas; making the power the cause of the act: As if one should assign for cause of the good or evil acts of men, their ability to do them.

And in many occasions they put for cause of natural events, their own ignorance; but disguised in other words: as when they say, fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause: and as when they attribute many effects to occult qualities; that is, qualities not known to them; and therefore also (as

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of all men that resolve of their conclusions, before they know their premises; pretending to comprehend, that which is incomprehensible; and of attributes of honour to make attributes of nature; as this distinction was made to maintain the doctrine of free-will, that is, of a will of man, not subject to the will of God.

Aristotle, and other heathen philosophers define good and evil, by the appetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own law: For in the condition of men that have no other law but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good, and evil actions. But in a commonwealth this measure is false: not the appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state is the measure. And

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to maintain the doctrine of free-will, that is, of a will of man, not subject to the will of God.

Aristotle, and other heathen philosophers define good and evil, by the appetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own law: For in the condition of men that have no other law but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good, and evil actions. But in a commonwealth this measure is false: not the appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state is the measure. And yet is this doctrine still practised; and men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own, and of other men's actions, and of the actions of the commonwealth itself, by their own passions; and no man calleth good or evil, but

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and evil actions. But in a commonwealth this measure is false: not the appetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state is the measure. And yet is this doctrine still practised; and men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own, and of other men's actions, and of the actions of the commonwealth itself, by their own passions; and no man calleth good or evil, but that which is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the public laws; except only monks, and friars, that are bound by vow to that simple obedience to their superior, to which every subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civil sovereign. And this private measure of good, is a doctrine, not only vain, but also pernicious to the public state.

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express their anger in; but call readily the one anarchy, and the other, oligarchy, or the tyranny of a few. And that which offendeth the people, is no other thing, but that they are governed, not as every one of them would himself, but as the public representant, be it one man, or an assembly of men thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government: for which they give evil names to their superiors; never knowing (till perhaps a little after a civil war) that without such arbitrary government, such war must be perpetual; and that it is men, and arms, not words and promises, that make the force and power of the laws.

And therefore this is another error of Aristotle's politics, that in a well-ordered commonwealth, not men should

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be justified.

And because the name of tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor less, than the name of sovereignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to be angry with them they call tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny, is a toleration of hatred to commonwealth in general, and another evil seed, not differing much from the former. For to the justification of the cause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause of the conquered, is for the most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the obligation of the conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say upon the review of the first and second part of this discourse.

In Chapter 35, I have

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yet I understand not how such a liberty can be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what is else the question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible or not?

There are in the same place other distinctions: as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely of doing not good, or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil respectively, and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.

And with these distinctions his Lordship says he clears the

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and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what is else the question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible or not?

There are in the same place other distinctions: as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely of doing not good, or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil respectively, and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.

And with these distinctions his Lordship says he clears the coast, whereas in truth, he darkeneth his own meaning and the

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same place other distinctions: as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely of doing not good, or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil respectively, and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.

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exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely of doing not good, or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil respectively, and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.

And with these distinctions his Lordship says he clears the coast, whereas in truth, he darkeneth his own meaning and the question, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is: for how is it possible that the liberty of doing or not doing

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darkeneth his own meaning and the question, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is: for how is it possible that the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can consist, as he says it does in God and good angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?

The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into two squadrons, one of places of Scriptures, the other of reasons, which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe

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that the husband is a free and voluntary agent, but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose, by precedent necessary causes.

For if there come into the husband's mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily; and if the evil that will follow in the husband's opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow: and yet in this following of one's hopes and fears, consisteth the nature of election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.

The second place of Scripture is Joshua, xxiv. 15. The

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brute beasts, do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take, the horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth a man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him away.

A child may be so young as to do what it does without all deliberation, but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod: for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be deliberated on the second time.

Fools and madmen manifestly

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punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of heaven and hell.

To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom. ix. 20, 21. From the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid down the very same objection in these words: When they, meaning Esau and Jacob, were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto her (viz. Rebecca) that the elder should serve the younger, &c. What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith to

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To make the law, is therefore to make a cause of justice, and to necessitate justice; and consequently, it is no injustice to make such a law.

The intention of the law is not to grieve the delinquent, for that which is past, and not to be undone; but to make him and others just, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act past, but the good to come; insomuch as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated,

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can please me, or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity? Things may be therefore necessary, and yet praise-worthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of them both in vain, because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus (Lib. II. 35) gives Cato, where he says that he was good by nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit.

To the fifth and sixth inconveniences, that counsels, arts, arms, instruments, books, study, medicines, and the like, would be superfluous, the same answer serves as to the

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every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools, and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them, by authority of doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over men's reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of other men.

In the next place his Lordship bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between free from compulsion

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to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left him, and a deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether he will be hauled and trained on the ground, or make use of his own feet: likewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, it necessarily determines him to the doing of it; yet he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not, or mark

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his Lordship, for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this, that it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.

Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sense, move more powerfully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lordship says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence, that repentance proceedeth from causes.

The last part of this discourse

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ought not to desert this certain truth, that there are certain and necessary causes which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, and punishment, good and evil, sequels of men's actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect, and that the memory of such things proceeds from the senses, and sense from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by consequence all actions, even of free

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as briefly as I can, without any terms of art, in plain English.

MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. FIRST I conceive, that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing it or abstaining necessarily follow the present thought he hath of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden anger, the action shall follow the thought of revenge; in sudden fear, the thought of escape. Also when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the

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though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election.

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consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election.

Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or, which is the same thing, alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth.

Thirdly, I conceive that in all deliberations, that

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whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or, which is the same thing, alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth.

Thirdly, I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the WILL, and is immediately next

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own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he useth in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates; such is his will, that agent or that action is free. Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that deliberation is the consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come; that by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate action, or else nothing is meant by it; that will is the last act of our deliberation; that a free agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and that liberty is the absence of external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not

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for it hath raised an infinite number of controversies in the Christian world concerning religion, and from those controversies, wars. It is like that Empusa in the Athenian comic poet, which was taken in Athens for a ghost that changed shapes, having one brazen leg, but the other was the leg of an ass, and was sent, as was believed, by Hecate, as a sign of some approaching evil fortune. Against this Empusa I think there cannot be invented a better exorcism, than to distinguish between the rules of religion, that is, the rules of honouring God, which we have from the laws, and the rules of philosophy, that is, the opinions of private men; and to yield what is due to religion to the Holy Scripture, and what is due to philosophy to natural reason. And this I

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them. Now, all such calamities as may be avoided by human industry, arise from war, but chiefly from civil war; for from this proceed slaughter, solitude, and the want of all things. But the cause of war is not that men are willing to have it; for the will has nothing for object but good, at least that which seemeth good. Nor is it from this, that men know not that the effects of war are evil; for who is there that thinks not poverty and loss of life to be great evils? The cause, therefore, of civil war is, that men know not the causes neither of war nor peace, there being but few in the world that have learned those duties which unite and keep men in peace, that is to say, that have learned the rules of civil life sufficiently. Now, the knowledge of these rules is moral

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to one, sometimes to the other, is from appetite called hope, and from aversion, fear. For where there is no hope, it is not to be called fear, but hate; and where no fear, not hope, but desire. To conclude, all the passions, called passions of the mind, consist of appetite and aversion, except pure pleasure and pain, which are a certain fruition of good or evil; as anger is aversion from some imminent evil, but such as is joined with appetite of avoiding that evil by force. But because the passions and perturbations of the mind are innumerable, and many of them not to be discerned in any creatures besides men; I will speak of them more at large in that section which is concerning man. As for those objects, if there be any such, which do not

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called hope, and from aversion, fear. For where there is no hope, it is not to be called fear, but hate; and where no fear, not hope, but desire. To conclude, all the passions, called passions of the mind, consist of appetite and aversion, except pure pleasure and pain, which are a certain fruition of good or evil; as anger is aversion from some imminent evil, but such as is joined with appetite of avoiding that evil by force. But because the passions and perturbations of the mind are innumerable, and many of them not to be discerned in any creatures besides men; I will speak of them more at large in that section which is concerning man. As for those objects, if there be any such, which do not at all stir the mind, we are said to contemn

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For where there is no hope, it is not to be called fear, but hate; and where no fear, not hope, but desire. To conclude, all the passions, called passions of the mind, consist of appetite and aversion, except pure pleasure and pain, which are a certain fruition of good or evil; as anger is aversion from some imminent evil, but such as is joined with appetite of avoiding that evil by force. But because the passions and perturbations of the mind are innumerable, and many of them not to be discerned in any creatures besides men; I will speak of them more at large in that section which is concerning man. As for those objects, if there be any such, which do not at all stir the mind, we are said to contemn them.

And thus much of sense in

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make a vow, it is left to her husband's choice, either to establish it, or to make it void, (Numb. xxx. 13): and (Josh. xxiv. 15): Chuse ye this day whom you will serve, &c. But I and my house will serve the Lord: and (2 Sam. xxiv. 12): I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall do: and (Isaiah vii. 16): before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good. And besides these very many other places to the same effect.

The third sort of texts are those which seem to make against me. As Isaiah v. 4: What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?

And Jeremiah xix. 5: They have also built the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt

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necessity of the hardness of heart, both in Pharaoh and in Sihon, is as easily derived from God's permission, that is, from his withholding his grace, as from his positive decree. And whereas they say, He wills godly and free actions conditionally and consequently, that is, if the man will them, then God wills them, else not; and wills not evil actions, but permits them; they ascribe to God nothing at all in the causation of any action either good or bad.

Now to the third sort of places, that seem to contradict the former, let us see if they may not be reconciled with a more intelligible and reasonable interpretation, than that wherewith the Schoolmen interpret the first.

It is no

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perform it or forbear it; secondly, that we be obliged to perform it, or forbear it, respectively; thirdly, that we omit that which we ought to have done, or do that which we ought to have omitted. (h) No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his power. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have also an appetite to evil objects, which renders them culpable. It is true; but if this appetite be determined by another, not by themselves, or if they have not the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites, they sin no more than a stone descending downward, according to its natural appetite, or the brute beasts who commit voluntary errors in following their sensitive appetites, yet sin not.

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how could they help it?" I answer they could not help it. "I would have gathered your children as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not. How easily might they answer, according to T. H.'s doctrine, Alas! blame not us, our wills are not in our own power?" I answer, they are to be blamed though their wills be not in their own power. Is not good good, and evil evil, though they be not in our power? and shall not I call them so? and is not that praise and blame? But it seems the Bishop takes blame, not for the dispraise of a thing, but for a pretext and colour of malice and revenge against him he blameth. And where he says our wills are in our power, he sees not that he speaks absurdly; for he ought to say, the will is the power; and through

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could they help it?" I answer they could not help it. "I would have gathered your children as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not. How easily might they answer, according to T. H.'s doctrine, Alas! blame not us, our wills are not in our own power?" I answer, they are to be blamed though their wills be not in their own power. Is not good good, and evil evil, though they be not in our power? and shall not I call them so? and is not that praise and blame? But it seems the Bishop takes blame, not for the dispraise of a thing, but for a pretext and colour of malice and revenge against him he blameth. And where he says our wills are in our power, he sees not that he speaks absurdly; for he ought to say, the will is the power; and through ignorance

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and we do as much blame them as we do men. For we say fire hath done hurt, and the poison hath killed a man, as well as we say the man hath done unjustly; but we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of poison, because we cannot make them ask forgiveness, as we would make men to do when they hurt us. So that the blaming of the one and the other, that is, the declaring of the hurt or evil action done by them, is the same in both; but the malice of man is only against man.

(h) "No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun."

He may as well say, no man halts which cannot choose but halt; or stumbles, that cannot choose but stumble. For what is sin, but halting or stumbling in the way of God's commandments?

(i) "The question then is not,

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from servitude, nor a liberty from violence, but I understand a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessitation; that is, an universal immunity from all inevitability and determination to one; whether it be of exercise only, which the Schools call a liberty of contradiction, and is found in God and in the good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this or that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of specification and exercise also, which the Schools call liberty of contrariety, and is found in men endowed with reason and understanding, that is, a liberty to do and not to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared," &c.

T. H.

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from necessity, or rather from necessitation; that is, an universal immunity from all inevitability and determination to one; whether it be of exercise only, which the Schools call a liberty of contradiction, and is found in God and in the good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this or that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of specification and exercise also, which the Schools call liberty of contrariety, and is found in men endowed with reason and understanding, that is, a liberty to do and not to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared," &c.

T. H. In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and says,

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in the good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this or that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of specification and exercise also, which the Schools call liberty of contrariety, and is found in men endowed with reason and understanding, that is, a liberty to do and not to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared," &c.

T. H. In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and says, he means not liberty from sin, nor from servitude, nor from violence, but from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and determination to one. It had been better to define liberty, than thus to distinguish; for I understand never the more what he

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And though he says he means liberty from necessitation, yet I understand not how such a liberty can be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what else is the question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible or not? There are in the same place other distinctions, as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively: and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil, but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these distinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning, not only

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understand not how such a liberty can be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what else is the question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible or not? There are in the same place other distinctions, as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively: and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil, but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these distinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also,

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possible or not? There are in the same place other distinctions, as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively: and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil, but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these distinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to

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as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively: and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil, but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these distinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist, as he saith it doth in God and Angels, without

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or evil, but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these distinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist, as he saith it doth in God and Angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?

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clears the coast, whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist, as he saith it doth in God and Angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?

J. D. (a) "It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to be distinguished. No men delight in confused generalities, but either sophisters or bunglers. Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus, deceitful men do not love to descend to particulars; and when bad archers

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and liberty of contradiction, or which is all one, of exercise only, or exercise and specification jointly, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is so true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is scarce that writer of note, either divine or philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, but he useth it.

"Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of things. Therefore to be able to choose both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, or of specification. To choose this, and not to choose this, are contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power. Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the

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or exercise and specification jointly, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is so true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is scarce that writer of note, either divine or philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, but he useth it.

"Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of things. Therefore to be able to choose both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, or of specification. To choose this, and not to choose this, are contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power. Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now a man is not only able to do or

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or of specification. To choose this, and not to choose this, are contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power. Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now a man is not only able to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able both to do and to forbear to do both good and evil. So he hath not only a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the good angels can do or not do this or that good; but they cannot do and not do both

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contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power. Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now a man is not only able to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able both to do and to forbear to do both good and evil. So he hath not only a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the good angels can do or not do this or that good; but they cannot do and not do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or contradiction,

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he is able both to do and to forbear to do both good and evil. So he hath not only a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the good angels can do or not do this or that good; but they cannot do and not do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or contradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It appears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty of God and the good angels, whose object is only good. But withal the liberty of man comes short in the intention of the power. Man is not so

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but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the good angels can do or not do this or that good; but they cannot do and not do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or contradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It appears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty of God and the good angels, whose object is only good. But withal the liberty of man comes short in the intention of the power. Man is not so free in respect of good only, as God or the good angels, because (not to speak of God, whose liberty is quite of another nature) the understandings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion over their actions is greater,

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of another nature) the understandings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion over their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is cleared from all darkness.

"And where T. H. demands, how it is possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the answer is obvious and easy, referendo singula singulis, rendering every act to its right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively

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dominion over their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is cleared from all darkness.

"And where T. H. demands, how it is possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the answer is obvious and easy, referendo singula singulis, rendering every act to its right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God and good

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the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the answer is obvious and easy, referendo singula singulis, rendering every act to its right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God and good and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath."

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. IV.

He intendeth here to make good the distinctions of

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God and angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the answer is obvious and easy, referendo singula singulis, rendering every act to its right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God and good and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath."

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. IV.

He intendeth here to make good the distinctions of liberty of exercise, and liberty of contradiction; liberty of

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rendering every act to its right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God and good and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath."

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. IV.

He intendeth here to make good the distinctions of liberty of exercise, and liberty of contradiction; liberty of contrariety, and liberty of specification and exercise. And he begins thus:

(a) "It is a

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be otherwise than it is; therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election to choose this or that indifferently, is to make the same thing to be determined to one, and to be not determined to one, which are contradictories. Again, whosoever hath an elective power, or a liberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power to refuse; (Isaiah vii. 16): Before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good. He who chooseth this rather than that, refuseth that rather than this. As Moses (Hebrews xi. 25), choosing to suffer affliction with the people of God, did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin. But no man hath any power to refuse that which is necessarily predetermined to be, unless it be as the fox refused the grapes which were beyond his reach. When one thing of

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are free to name whom they will, but not to will; and in the second, the senior having an appetite, chooseth what he hath an appetite to; but chooseth not his appetite.

NO. VII.

T. H. For if there came into the husband's mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily. And if the evil that will follow thereon in the husband's opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow. And yet in this following of one's hopes and fears consisteth the nature of election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this. And consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.

J. D. (a) "There is nothing said with more show of reason in

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furnishes you with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take: the horse, retiring from some strange figure he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him? A child may be so young as to do all which it does without all deliberation, but that is but till it chance to be hurt by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod; for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall be deliberated on a second time. Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the

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objects, or inward fancies, may produce a stay in his course, though he have no judgment either to deliberate or elect. 'He retires from some strange figure which he sees, and comes on again to avoid the spur.'So he may; and yet be far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the sensitive passion of fear, which is a perturbation arising from the expectation of some imminent evil. But he urgeth, 'what else doth a man that deliberateth?'Yes, very much. The horse feareth some outward object, but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same end. Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one; fear is of those things which are not in our power, deliberation of those things which are in our power; fear ariseth many times out of natural

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of nature deliberation hath no place at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, and betrayeth the succours of the soul. If the horse did deliberate, he should consult with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or not; he would represent to himself all the dangers both of going and staying, and compare the one with the other, and elect that which is less evil; he should consider whether it were not better to endure a little hazard, than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty towards his master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the horse doth not; neither is it possible for him to do it. Secondly, for children, T. H. confesseth that they may be so young that they do not deliberate at all; afterwards, as they attain to the use

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the first motions or rash attempts of choleric persons with such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those rash attempts are voluntary actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by acquired habits. But yet for as much as actions are often altered and varied by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so as that act which at one time is morally good, at another time may be morally evil; and for as much as a general precedent deliberation how to do this kind of action, is not sufficient to make this or that particular action good or expedient, which being in itself good, yet particular circumstances may render inconvenient or unprofitable to some persons, at some times, in some places: therefore a precedent general deliberation how to do any act, as for instance, how to

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words may be taken without repugnance to the doctrine of necessity. These words, Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat, convince Adam that, notwithstanding God had placed in the garden a means to keep him perpetually from dying in case he should accommodate his will to obedience of God's commandment concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his own will as to do it. Whereby is signified, that a mortal man, though invited by the promise of immortality, cannot govern his own will, though his will govern his actions; which dependence of the actions on the will, is that which properly and truly is called liberty. And the like may be said of the words to Eve, Why hast thou done

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from my heart. And I believe both I have reason so to do, and all others who shall seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it. It destroys liberty, and dishonours the nature of man. It makes the second causes and outward objects to be the rackets, and men to be but the tennis-balls of destiny. It makes the first cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the introducer of all evil and sin into the world, as much as man, yea, more than man, by as much as the motion of the watch is more from the artificer, who did make it and wind it up, than either from the spring, or the wheels, or the thread, if God, by his special influence into the second causes, did necessitate them to operate as they did. And if they, being thus determined, did necessitate Adam inevitably,

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necessitate Adam inevitably, irresistibly, not by an accidental, but by an essential subordination of causes to whatsoever he did, then one of these two absurdities must needs follow: either that Adam did not sin, and that there is no such thing as sin in the world, because it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially from God; or that God is more guilty of it, and more the cause of evil than man, because man is extrinsically, inevitably determined, but so is not God. And in causes essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect. What tyrant did ever impose laws that were impossible for those to keep, upon whom they were imposed, and punish them for breaking those laws, which he himself had necessitated them to break, which it was no more

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hatred, which is so dishonourable both to God and man; which makes men to blaspheme of necessity, to steal of necessity, to be hanged of necessity, and to be damned of necessity. And therefore I must say and say again, quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi. It were better to be an atheist, to believe no God; or to be a Manichee, to believe two Gods, a God of good and a God of evil, or with the heathens, to believe thirty thousand Gods: than thus to charge the true God to be the proper cause and the true author of all the sins and evils which are in the world."

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XI.

(a) "This argument was sent forth only as an espy, to make a more full discovery, what were the true grounds of

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same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of heaven or hell.

To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from St. Paul (Rom. ix.), from the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid down the very same objection in these words: When they (meaning Esau and Jacob) were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said to her (viz. to Rebecca) that the elder shall serve the younger. And what then shall we say, is there injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I

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punish man, who did only receive the impression from him. So his answer looks another way.

"But because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examine all those passages which may seem to favour his cause. First, these words (ver. 11): being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, upon which the whole weight of his argument doth depend, have no reference at all to those words (verse 13), Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated: for those words were first uttered by the prophet Malachi, many ages after Jacob and Esau were dead (Mal. i. 2, 3), and intended of the posterity of Esau, who were not redeemed from captivity as the Israelites were. But they are

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God either to the one or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of this? All men confess that God's mercies do exceed man's deserts, but God's punishments do never exceed man's misdeeds. As we see in the parable of the labourers (Matth. xx. 13-15): Friend, I do thee no wrong. Did not I agree with thee for a penny? Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as I will? Is thy eye evil, because I am good? Acts of mercy are free, but acts of justice are due.

"That which follows (verse 17) comes something nearer the cause. The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, for this same purpose I have raised thee up, (that is, I have made thee a king, or I have preserved thee), that I might show my power in thee. But this particle, that, doth not always signify

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his judgments. Hitherto we find no eternal punishments, nor no temporal punishment without just deserts.

"It follows, (ver. 18), whom he will he hardeneth. Indeed hardness of heart is the greatest judgment that God lays upon a sinner in this life, worse than all the plagues of Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart? Not by a natural influence of any evil act or habit into the will, nor by inducing the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy and rebellion (James i, 13, 14): For God tempteth no man, but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Then God is said to harden the heart three ways; first, negatively, and not positively; not by imparting wickedness, but by not imparting grace; as the sun

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It is an act of mercy in God to give his grace freely, but to detain it is no act of injustice. So the apostle opposeth hardening to shewing of mercy. To harden is as much as not to shew mercy.

"Secondly, God is said to harden the heart occasionally and not causally, by doing good, (which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of growing worse and worse), and doing evil; as a master by often correcting of an untoward scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally harden his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he grows even to despise the rod. Or as an indulgent parent by his patience and gentleness doth encourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious. So, whether we look upon God's frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God's iterated favours

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more rebellious. So, whether we look upon God's frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God's iterated favours in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon Pharaoh's request, both of them in their several kinds were occasions of hardening Pharaoh's heart, the one making him more presumptuous, the other more desperately rebellious. So that which was good in it was God's; that which was evil was Pharaoh's. God gave the occasion, but Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly confirmed, Exodus viii. 15: When Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardened his heart. And Exodus ix. 34: When Pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants. So Psalm cv. 25:

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the Egyptians did take occasion to hate them, as is plain, Exodus i. 7, 8, 9, 10. So God hardened Pharaoh's heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own heart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as he did to Nebuchadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he, or God hardened it occasionally; but still Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration, by determining his own will to evil, and confirming himself in his obstinacy. So are all presumptuous sinners, (Psalm xcv. 8): Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, or as in the day of temptation in the wilderness.

"Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, but not operatively, nor effectively, as he who only lets loose a greyhound out of the slip, is said to hound him

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wrath, he saith only that they were fitted to destruction, that is, not by God, but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth endure the vessels of wrath with much long-suffering. T. H. saith, that God wills and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad, that he necessitateth them, and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts which he condemneth as evil, and for which he punisheth them. If doing willingly, and enduring, if much long-suffering, and necessitating, imply not a contrariety one to another, reddat mihi minam Diogenes, let him that taught me logic, give me my money again.

"But T. H. saith, that this distinction between the operative and permissive will

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him, doth yet condemn him for example's sake, that by the death of one he may save the lives of many. Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of his glory, and for the greater benefit of his faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would not suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out of evil. Yet this ought not to be understood, as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another; because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but

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the death of one he may save the lives of many. Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of his glory, and for the greater benefit of his faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would not suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out of evil. Yet this ought not to be understood, as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another; because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these

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respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God; for they are the same with the divine essence, which is one. But the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission. God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good and evil.

(c) "T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because he concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special influence. As the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat; but the

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are the same, but considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God; for they are the same with the divine essence, which is one. But the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission. God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good and evil.

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to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission. God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good and evil.

(c) "T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because he concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special influence. As the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat; but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the root. Even so the general power to act is from God. In him we live, and

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to wheat; but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the root. Even so the general power to act is from God. In him we live, and move, and have our being. This is good. But the specification, and determination of this general power to the doing of any evil, is from ourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of man. This is bad. And to speak properly, the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, as the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or being in it, as poison hath; but rather the deficient cause. Now no defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection.

(d)

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in it, as poison hath; but rather the deficient cause. Now no defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection.

(d) Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God, but the specification of this general and good power to murder, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man. So T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the law, and likewise of the action in some sort, that is, by general influence; and yet another cause concurring, by special influence and determining this general and good power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy or the irregularity. And therefore he may keep his

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the irresistible power and absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all his actions. And that the apostle in his answer doth not deny that it was God's will, nor that God's decree was before Esau's sin.

"To which I reply, first, that the case is not at all the same, but quite different, as may appear by these particulars; first, those words, before they had done either good or evil, are not, cannot be referred to those other words, Esau have I hated. Secondly, if they could, yet it is less than nothing, because before Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were known to God. Thirdly, by the potter's clay, here is not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass of mankind. Fourthly, the hating here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that

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permissive, it is enough for the necessity of the thing that the heart of Pharaoh should be hardened, and if God were not willing to do it, I cannot conceive how it could be done without him.

(c) "T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action, and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action? I answer, because he concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special, influence."

I had thought to pass over this place, because of the nonsense of general and special influence. Seeing he saith that God concurs to the doing of evil, I desire the reader would take notice, that if he blame me for speaking of God as of a necessitating cause, and as it were a principal agent in the causing of all actions, he may with as

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(c) "T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action, and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action? I answer, because he concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special, influence."

I had thought to pass over this place, because of the nonsense of general and special influence. Seeing he saith that God concurs to the doing of evil, I desire the reader would take notice, that if he blame me for speaking of God as of a necessitating cause, and as it were a principal agent in the causing of all actions, he may with as good reason blame himself for making him by concurrence an accessory to the same. And indeed, let men hold what they will contrary to the truth, if they write much, the truth will fall into their pens. But

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which is very absurd; or else he must confess that the venomous effects of wicked men are willed operatively.

(d) Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act, is from God; but the specification of this general and good power, to murder, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free will of man."

But why am I so mightily mistaken? Did not God foreknow that Uriah in particular, should be murdered by David in particular? And what God foreknoweth shall come to pass, can that possibly not come so to pass? And that which cannot possibly not come to pass, doth not that necessarily come to pass? And is not all necessity from God? I

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and make their will to justice? To make the law is therefore to make a cause of justice, and to necessitate justice; and consequently it is no injustice to make such a law.

The institution of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for that which is passed and not to be undone; but to make him and others just, that else would not be so: and respecteth not the evil act past, but the good to come. Insomuch as without this good intention of future, no past act of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But, you will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what was done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated, but that they are spared and

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that is to say, according to law? Does J. D. think, that no action can please me or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity?

Things may be therefore necessary and yet praiseworthy, as also necessary and yet dispraised, and neither of both in vain; because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good or evil. It was a very great praise, in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says, he was good by nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit.

To his fifth and sixth inconvenience, that counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments, study, medicines, and the like, would be superfluous, the same answer serves that to the former; that is to say, that this

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the wicked (Ephes. vi. 16). And if Satan, who can both propose the object, and choose out the fittest times and places to work upon our frailties, and can suggest reasons, yet cannot necessitate the will, (which is most certain); then much less can outward objects do it alone. They have no natural efficacy to determine the will. Well may they be occasions, but they cannot be causes of evil. The sensitive appetite may engender a proclivity to steal, but not a necessity to steal. And if it should produce a kind of necessity, yet it is but moral, not natural; hypothetical, not absolute; coexistent, not antecedent from ourselves, nor extrinsical. This necessity, or rather proclivity, was free in its causes; we ourselves by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we

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cannot draw him from it. Make a thousand laws that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men do, according to T. H., they do it as necessarily as the fire burneth. Hang up a thousand thieves, and if a man be determined inevitably to steal, he must steal notwithstanding.

(f) "He adds, that 'the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come, and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example.'The truth is, the punishing of delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil act passed and the good to come. The ground of it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end

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"He adds, that 'the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come, and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example.'The truth is, the punishing of delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil act passed and the good to come. The ground of it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end of it, is the good to come. The end without the ground cannot justify the act. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it, nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others; that is

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delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come, and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example.'The truth is, the punishing of delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil act passed and the good to come. The ground of it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end of it, is the good to come. The end without the ground cannot justify the act. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it, nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others; that is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncertain. Again,

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others by his example.'The truth is, the punishing of delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil act passed and the good to come. The ground of it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end of it, is the good to come. The end without the ground cannot justify the act. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it, nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others; that is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncertain. Again, though there were no other end of penalties inflicted, neither probatory, nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but only vindicatory, to satisfy the law out of a zeal of justice by giving to every one his own, yet the action is just and

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our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular. (g) First, he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his actions, though he command one thing openly, and plot another thing secretly, though he be the cause not only of the action, but also of the irregularity; though he both give man power to act, and determine this power to evil as well as good; though he punish the creatures, for doing that which he himself did necessitate them to do. But being pressed with reason, that this is tyrannical, first to necessitate a man to do his will, and then to punish him for doing of it, he leaves this pretence in the plain field, and flies to a second; that therefore a man is justly punished for that which he was necessitated to

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to their respective ends, free means to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends, whereas T. H. would have all means, all ends, to be necessary. If God hath so ordered the world, that a man ought to use, and may freely use, those means of God, which he doth neglect, not by virtue of God's decree, but by his own fault; if a man use those means of evil, which he ought not to use, and which by God's decree he had power to forbear; if God have left to man in part the free managery of human affairs, and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding: then consultations are of use, then provident care is needful, then it concerns him to use the means. But if God have so ordered this world, that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any

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managery of human affairs, and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding: then consultations are of use, then provident care is needful, then it concerns him to use the means. But if God have so ordered this world, that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means of good, which by virtue of God's decree it is possible for him to use, and that he cannot possibly use any means of evil, but those which are irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree; then not only consultations are vain, but that noble faculty of reason itself is vain. Do we think that we can help God Almighty to do his proper work? In vain we trouble ourselves, in vain we take care to use those means, which are not in our power to use, or not to use. And this is that which was

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is not a metaphysical goodness; so the worst of things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good: nor a natural goodness; the praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of nature; God saw all that he had made, and it was very good: but a moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the conformity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action is the deformity of it, and the alienation of it from right reason. It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The moral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the good use of liberty,

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the fire itself either to communicate its heat or to suspend it; but I praise first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for the praise which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, that he was good by nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit; it hath more of the orator, than either of the theologian or philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and become evil; what privilege hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave. Narratur et divi Catonis sæpe mero caluisse virtus. But the true meaning is, that he was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of vice as others were. This is to praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not morally. Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, yet proved as good a man; the more his

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a law is do this, or do not this; or, if thou do this, thou shalt suffer this; but no law runs thus, will this, or will not this; or, if thou have a will to this, thou shalt suffer this. He objecteth further, that I beg the question, because no man's will is necessitated. Wherein he mistakes; for I say no more in that place, but that he that doth evil willingly, whether he be necessarily willing, or not necessarily, may be justly punished. And upon this mistake he runneth over again his former and already answered nonsense, saying, "we ourselves, by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should and might, have freely given them a kind of dominion over us;" and again, motus primo primi, the first motions are not

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are just, as laws, and therefore not to be accused of injustice by those that owe subjection to them; and a just law is always justly executed. Seeing then that he confesseth that all that he replieth to here is true, it followeth that the reply itself, where it contradicteth me, is false.

(f) "He addeth that the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come; and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example."

This he neither confirmeth nor denieth, and yet forbeareth not to discourse upon it to little purpose; and therefore I pass it over.

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the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this, that the former have the use of reason and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have not."

The true reason why we admonish men and not children, &c., is because admonition is nothing else but telling a man the good and evil consequences of his actions. They who have experience of good and evil, can better perceive the reasonableness of such admonition, than they that have not; and such as have like passions to those of the admonitor, do more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the admonitor saith is so, than they who have great passions, and such as are contrary to his. The first, which is want of

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for it but this, that the former have the use of reason and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have not."

The true reason why we admonish men and not children, &c., is because admonition is nothing else but telling a man the good and evil consequences of his actions. They who have experience of good and evil, can better perceive the reasonableness of such admonition, than they that have not; and such as have like passions to those of the admonitor, do more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the admonitor saith is so, than they who have great passions, and such as are contrary to his. The first, which is want of experience, maketh children and fools unapt; and the second, which is

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do more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the admonitor saith is so, than they who have great passions, and such as are contrary to his. The first, which is want of experience, maketh children and fools unapt; and the second, which is strength of passion, maketh madmen unwilling to receive admonition; for children are ignorant, and madmen in an error, concerning what is good or evil for themselves. This is not to say children and madmen want true liberty, that is, the liberty to do as they will, nor to say that men of judgment, or the admonitor himself hath a dominion over his own actions, more than children or madmen, (for their actions are also voluntary), or that when he admonisheth he hath always the use of reason, though he have the use of deliberation, which

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not of absolute signification to all men. God therefore saith, that all that he had made was very good, because he was pleased with the creatures of his own making. But if all things were absolutely good, we should be all pleased with their being, which we are not, when the actions that depend upon their being are hurtful to us. And therefore, to speak properly, nothing is good or evil but in regard of the action that proceedeth from it, and also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt. Satan is evil to us, because he seeketh our destruction, but good to God, because he executeth his commandments. And so his metaphysical goodness is but an idle term, and not the member of a distinction. And as for natural goodness and evilness, that also is but the goodness and

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pleased with the creatures of his own making. But if all things were absolutely good, we should be all pleased with their being, which we are not, when the actions that depend upon their being are hurtful to us. And therefore, to speak properly, nothing is good or evil but in regard of the action that proceedeth from it, and also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt. Satan is evil to us, because he seeketh our destruction, but good to God, because he executeth his commandments. And so his metaphysical goodness is but an idle term, and not the member of a distinction. And as for natural goodness and evilness, that also is but the goodness and evilness of actions; as some herbs are good because they nourish, others evil because they poison us; and one horse is

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to whom it doth good or hurt. Satan is evil to us, because he seeketh our destruction, but good to God, because he executeth his commandments. And so his metaphysical goodness is but an idle term, and not the member of a distinction. And as for natural goodness and evilness, that also is but the goodness and evilness of actions; as some herbs are good because they nourish, others evil because they poison us; and one horse is good because he is gentle, strong, and carrieth a man easily; another bad, because he resisteth, goeth hard, or otherwise displeaseth us; and that quality of gentleness, if there were no more laws amongst men than there is amongst beasts, would be as much a moral good in a horse or other beast as in a man. It is the law from whence proceeds the

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the state would have it, or according to the law of the land, he answers, that "I mistake infinitely". And his reason is, because "we often wish what is profitable or delightful, without regarding as we ought what is honest". There is no man living that seeth all the consequences of an action from the beginning to the end, whereby to weigh the whole sum of the good with the whole sum of the evil consequence. We choose no further than we can weigh. That is good to every man, which is so far good as he can see. All the real good, which we call honest and morally virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to the law, civil or natural; for the law is all the right reason we have, and, (though he, as often as it disagreeth with his own reason, deny it), is the infallible rule of moral

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from his own error, but from antecedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous to perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go beyond, nor come short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which are inevitable, or to confer those favours which are impossible? We indeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us: but this we know, that if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that which must be. In a word, the only reason why those persons, who tread in this path of fatal destiny, do sometimes pray, or repent, or serve God, is because the light of nature, and the strength of reason, and the evidence of Scripture, do for that present transport them

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not with any intention that they should be converted and saved, but merely to harden their hearts, and to make them inexcusable? How shall a man receive the blessed sacrament with comfort and confidence, as a seal of God's love in Christ, who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the passions of Christ, before they had done either good or evil? How shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who apprehendeth that eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation, but, because God would damn a man, therefor he necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily? How shall a man make a free vow to God without gross ridiculous hypocrisy, who thinks he is able to perform nothing but as he is extrinsically necessitated?

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or any other Christian believe, that God intendeth, by hardening any man's heart, to make that man inexcusable, but to make his elect the more careful.

Likewise to his question, "how shall a man receive the sacrament with comfort, who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded from the benefit of Christ's passion, before they had done either good or evil"; I answer as before, by faith, if he be of God's elect; if not, he shall not receive the sacrament with comfort. I may answer also, that the faithful man shall receive the sacrament with comfort, by the same way that the bishop receiveth it with comfort. For he also believeth that many millions are excluded from the benefit of Christ's passion, (whether positively or not positively

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also, that the faithful man shall receive the sacrament with comfort, by the same way that the bishop receiveth it with comfort. For he also believeth that many millions are excluded from the benefit of Christ's passion, (whether positively or not positively is nothing to the purpose, nor doth positively signify any thing in this place); and that, so long before they had either done good or evil, as it was known to God before they were born that they were so excluded.

To his "how shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who apprehendeth that eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation, but because God would damn a man, therefore he necessitates him": I answer, that he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, does not believe that

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given us here of repentance: 'It is a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way.'It amazed me to find gladness to be the first word in the description of repentance."

I could never be of opinion that Christian repentance could be ascribed to them, that had as yet no intention to forsake their sins and to lead a new life. He that grieves for the evil that hath happened to him for his sins, but hath not a resolution to obey God's commandments better for the time to come, grieveth for his sufferings, but not for his doings; which no divine, I think, will call Christian repentance. But he that resolveth upon amendment of life, knoweth that there is forgiveness for him in Christ Jesus; whereof a Christian cannot possibly be but glad.

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the indetermination can make it happen or not happen, is absurd; for indetermination maketh it equally to happen or not to happen, and therefore both; which is a contradiction. Therefore indetermination doth nothing; and whatsoever causes do, is necessary.

NO. XVII.

J. D. "Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take away the very nature of evil, and the formal reason of sin. If the hand of the painter were the law of painting, or the hand of the writer the law of writing, whatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing therefore that the first cause is the rule and law of goodness, if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by itself immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of

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"Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take away the very nature of evil, and the formal reason of sin. If the hand of the painter were the law of painting, or the hand of the writer the law of writing, whatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing therefore that the first cause is the rule and law of goodness, if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by itself immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of second causes, it will no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists in this, that one commit that which he might avoid. If there be no liberty to produce sin, there is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it appears, both from Scripture and reason, that there is true liberty."

T. H. To the fifth argument

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hand of the painter were the law of painting, or the hand of the writer the law of writing, whatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing therefore that the first cause is the rule and law of goodness, if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by itself immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of second causes, it will no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists in this, that one commit that which he might avoid. If there be no liberty to produce sin, there is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it appears, both from Scripture and reason, that there is true liberty."

T. H. To the fifth argument from reason, which is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away,

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is sin. But this opinion, of the necessity of all things by reason of a conflux of second causes, ordered and determined by the first cause, doth take away the very formal reason of sin. This is proved thus. That which makes sin itself to be good, and just, and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and destroys the essence of sin; for if sin be good, and just, and lawful, it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the necessity of all things, makes sin to be very good, and just, and lawful; for nothing can flow essentially by way of physical determination from the first cause, which is the law and rule of goodness and justice, but that which is good, and just, and lawful. But this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of physical determination

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that good may come of it. And if his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true, the destinies of men could not be altered, either by examples or fear of punishment."

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP'S REPLY NO. XVII.

Whereas he had in his first discourse made this consequence: "if you take away liberty, you take away the very nature of evil, and the formal reason of sin": I denied that consequence. It is true, he who taketh away the liberty of doing, according to the will, taketh away the nature of sin; but he that denieth the liberty to will, does not so. But he supposing I understood him not, will needs reduce his argument into form, in this manner. (a) "That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin, and by

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false) that if a man do this he shall live, and he may do this if he will. In this the Bishop and I disagree not. This therefore is not the question; but whether the will to do this, or not to do this, be in a man's own election. Whereas he adds, 'he that wills not the death of a sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent creature'; he had forgot for awhile, that both good and evil men are by the will of God all mortal; but presently corrects himself, and says, he means by death, eternal torments, that is to say, eternal life, but in torments; to which I have answered once before in this book, and spoken much more amply in another book, to which the Bishop hath inclination to make an answer, as appeareth by his epistle to the reader. That which followeth to the end

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of exercise, but not of specification. A liberty of exercise, that is, to do or not to do, may consist well with a necessity of specification, or a determination to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise, and a necessity of exercise, a liberty of specification, and a necessity of specification, are not compatible, nor can consist together. He that is antecedently necessitated to do evil, is not free to do good. So this instance is nothing at all to the purpose."

T. H. But the distinction of free, into free from compulsion, and free from necessitation, I acknowledge. For to be free from compulsion, is to do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it. For a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing

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other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no license at all?

You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools; and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them by authority of doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for, nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over man's reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scripture, but by pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of other men.

J. D. "He who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the grounds of learning, had need either to speak by an

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saith he, is a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular. Upon better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so likewise, to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary objects or to diverse kind of things. So his reason to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty of specification, falls flat to the ground: and he may lay aside his lenten licence for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these things, which are so evident that no man

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do this or that in particular. Upon better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so likewise, to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary objects or to diverse kind of things. So his reason to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty of specification, falls flat to the ground: and he may lay aside his lenten licence for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these things, which are so evident that no man can question them who doth understand

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and larboard, because they please not him, or because he accounts it gibberish. No, no: it is not the School divines, but innovators and seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of Europe. (i) T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, De Cive, cap. XII.: 'that it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons': and cap. XVII. 'that in questions of faith, the civil magistrates ought to consult with ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God's blessing is derived by imposition of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, to whom our Saviour hath promised infallibility.'These are the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to them; here he

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the divine to use no word in preaching but such as his auditors, nor in writing but such as a common reader, may understand. And all this, not for the pleasing of my palate, but for the promotion of truth.

(i) "T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, De Cive, cap. XII, that it is 'a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons': and cap. XVII, that 'in questions of faith the civil magistrates ought to consult with the ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God's blessing is derived by imposition of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary truths,'&c. There he attributes too much to them, here he attributeth too little; both there and here he takes too much upon him. The spirits of

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in necessary truths,'&c. There he attributes too much to them, here he attributeth too little; both there and here he takes too much upon him. The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets." He thinks he hath a great advantage against me from my own words in my book De Cive, which he would not have thought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evil is judicature, which in Latin is cognitio causarum, not scientia. Every private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and evil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in others, belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power appointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting, that cognoscere is

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of the prophets are subject to the prophets." He thinks he hath a great advantage against me from my own words in my book De Cive, which he would not have thought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evil is judicature, which in Latin is cognitio causarum, not scientia. Every private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and evil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in others, belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power appointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting, that cognoscere is to judge, as Adam did of God's commandment, hath cited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to

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he hath a great advantage against me from my own words in my book De Cive, which he would not have thought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evil is judicature, which in Latin is cognitio causarum, not scientia. Every private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and evil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in others, belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power appointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting, that cognoscere is to judge, as Adam did of God's commandment, hath cited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them, it is not that they cannot be deceived, but that a subject

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draw her inevitably and irresistibly, to follow him spontaneously, Lucretia in both these conditions is to be pitied. But the latter person is more guilty, and deserves greater punishment, who endeavours also, so much as in him lies, to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I dare not apply it, but thus only: take heed how we defend those secret and invincible necessitations to evil, though spontaneous and free from coaction.

"These are their fastnesses."

T. H. In the next place, he bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between being free from compulsion, and free from necessitation. The first is, that election is opposite, not only to coaction or compulsion, but also to necessitation or determination to one. This is it he

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example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left in him, and a deliberation to bethink which of these two he can better endure; and he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate, whether he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of his feet.

Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, necessarily determines him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates whilst sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly, when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not, or mark not the force that

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but just the contrary. The more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the liberty, and the more the knowledge of our own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable that the understanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge of it. And where there is no consideration nor use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by reason that their exterior senses are not totally bound, have a trick to walk in their sleep. Suppose such a one in that case should cast himself down a pair of stairs or from a bridge, and break his neck or drown himself; it were a mad jury that would find this man accessary to his own death. Why? Because it was not freely done, he had not then the use of reason.

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which is both a voluntary agent, and acts voluntarily.

(n) "My second reason against this distinction, of liberty from compulsion but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, and ought rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for all he saith he is not surprised, can be contented upon better advise to steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the reader, he makes an empty shew of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, between the elicite and

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voluntarily.

(n) "My second reason against this distinction, of liberty from compulsion but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, and ought rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for all he saith he is not surprised, can be contented upon better advise to steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the reader, he makes an empty shew of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, between the elicite and imperate acts of the will; first,

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man to do a dishonest action, and that the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children, nor the lions Daniel, to omit their duty; for somewhat else, namely, their confidence in God, did necessitate them to do their duty. That the fear of God's wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well said, and according to the text he citeth: and proveth strongly, that fear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man a courage to endure the lesser evil.

(e) "Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam minatur:--Excuse me, O Emperor; thou threatenest men with prison, but God threatens me with hell." This sentence, and that which he saith No. XVII, that neither the civil judge is the proper judge, nor the law of the land is the proper

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furnace could not compel the three children, nor the lions Daniel, to omit their duty; for somewhat else, namely, their confidence in God, did necessitate them to do their duty. That the fear of God's wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well said, and according to the text he citeth: and proveth strongly, that fear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man a courage to endure the lesser evil.

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voluntary. It seems that he calleth compulsion force; but I call it a fear of force, or of damage to be done by force, by which fear a man's will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will before. Force taketh away the sin, because the action is not his that is forced, but his that forceth. It is not always so in compulsion; because, in this case, a man electeth the less evil under the notion of good. But his instances of the betrothed damsel that was forced, and of Tamar, may, for anything there appeareth in the text, be instances of compulsion, and yet the damsel and Tamar be both innocent. In that which immediately followeth, concerning how far fear may extenuate a sin, there is nothing to be answered. I perceive in it he hath some glimmering of

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not how a cause can be necessary, and the effect not be necessarily produced.

(n) "My second reason against this distinction of liberty from compulsion, but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, &c." By this second reason, which he says is new, and demonstrates, &c., I cannot find what reason he means. For there are but two, whereof the latter is in these words: "Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools; there is a double act of the will; the one more remote,

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not be necessarily produced.

(n) "My second reason against this distinction of liberty from compulsion, but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, &c." By this second reason, which he says is new, and demonstrates, &c., I cannot find what reason he means. For there are but two, whereof the latter is in these words: "Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools; there is a double act of the will; the one more remote, called imperatus, &c.; the other

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and elicit acts as intelligible as those, I will confess I had no reason to find fault.

But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, between the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he says was only to hide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this argument of his; 'he who doth necessitate the will to evil, is the true cause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not necessitate the will to evil'. This argument is not to be found in this No. XX, to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was compelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in this place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference concerning the cause of evil,

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as intelligible as those, I will confess I had no reason to find fault.

But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, between the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he says was only to hide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this argument of his; 'he who doth necessitate the will to evil, is the true cause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not necessitate the will to evil'. This argument is not to be found in this No. XX, to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was compelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in this place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference concerning the cause of evil, and thinks he shall force

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confess I had no reason to find fault.

But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, between the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he says was only to hide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this argument of his; 'he who doth necessitate the will to evil, is the true cause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not necessitate the will to evil'. This argument is not to be found in this No. XX, to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was compelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in this place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference concerning the cause of evil, and thinks he shall force me to say that God is the cause of

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evil, is the true cause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not necessitate the will to evil'. This argument is not to be found in this No. XX, to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was compelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in this place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference concerning the cause of evil, and thinks he shall force me to say that God is the cause of sin. I shall say only what is said in the Scripture, non est malum, quod ego non feci. I shall say what Micaiah saith to Ahab, (1 Kings xxii. 23): Behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit into the mouth of all these thy prophets. I shall say that that is true, which the prophet David saith (2 Sam. xvi. 10): Let

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there is no necessity of our sinning; but in this, that there is no constraint. Bucer (Lib. de Concordia): Whereas the Catholics say, man has free will, we must understand it of freedom from constraint, and not freedom from necessity. Calvin (Inst. cap. II. sec. VI): And thus shall man be said to have free will, not because he hath equal freedom to do good and evil, but because he does the evil he does, not by constraint, but willingly. Monsr. du Moulin, in his Buckler of the Faith (art. IX): The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the will. Witness the devils, who are necessarily wicked, and yet sin freely without constraint. And the Synod of Dort: Liberty is not opposite to all kinds of necessity and

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but in this, that there is no constraint. Bucer (Lib. de Concordia): Whereas the Catholics say, man has free will, we must understand it of freedom from constraint, and not freedom from necessity. Calvin (Inst. cap. II. sec. VI): And thus shall man be said to have free will, not because he hath equal freedom to do good and evil, but because he does the evil he does, not by constraint, but willingly. Monsr. du Moulin, in his Buckler of the Faith (art. IX): The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the will. Witness the devils, who are necessarily wicked, and yet sin freely without constraint. And the Synod of Dort: Liberty is not opposite to all kinds of necessity and determination. It is indeed

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said of two suitors, that the one produced the better reasons, but the other must have the office. So reason often lies dejected at the feet of affection. Things nearer to the senses move more powerfully. Do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his child, than for the sin of his soul; yet appreciatively in the estimation of judgment, he accounts the offence of God a greater evil than any temporal loss.

"Next, I do not believe that a man is bound to weigh the expedience or inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the balance of his understanding; or to run up into his watch-tower with his perspective to take notice of every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of some hidden danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to petit

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maketh against him. For the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this; that it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects, that things nearer the senses move more powerfully than reason. What followeth thence but this; that the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequents to come? Fourthly, whereas he says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son, than for the sin of his soul: it makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary. And by consequence, repentance proceedeth from causes.

J. D. "The fourth pretence alleged

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he did, and that he did that which he hated. The Roman story is mistaken: there was no bribe in the case but affection. Whereas I urge, that those things which are nearer to the senses do move more powerfully, he lays hold on it; and without answering to that for which I produced it, infers, 'that the sense of present good, is more immediate to the action than the foresight of evil consequents': which is true; but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity. Let a man do what he may do, and what he ought to do, and sensitive objects will lose that power which they have by his own fault and neglect. Antecedent or indeliberate concupiscence doth sometimes, but rarely, surprise a man, and render the action not free. But consequent and deliberated

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which proceeds from the rational will, doth render the action more free, not less free, and introduceth only a necessity upon supposition.

"Lastly, he saith, that 'a man's mourning more for the loss of his child than for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictates of the understanding'. Yes, very much. Reason dictates that a sin committed is a greater evil than the loss of a child, and ought more to be lamented for: yet we see daily how affection prevails against the dictate of reason. That which he infers from hence, that 'sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes'; is true as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense. The causes from whence repentance doth proceed, are God's grace

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it". And I say the same; as for example, that he ought not to desert this certain truth: that there are certain and necessary causes, which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive: seeing that we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and evil sequels of men's actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect; and that the memory of such things proceeds from the senses, and sense from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary.

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not able to clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my possession until a better title were showed for another. He is no old possessor, but a new pretender, and is bound to make good his claim by evident proofs: not by weak and inconsequent suppositions or inducements, such as those are which he useth here, of 'praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the memory of good and evil sequels and events'; which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessitate the will: nor by uncertain and accidental inferences, such as this; 'the memory of praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us'(he should say, dispose us) 'to elect what we elect; but the memory of these things is from the sense, and the sense from the operation of

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not by weak and inconsequent suppositions or inducements, such as those are which he useth here, of 'praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the memory of good and evil sequels and events'; which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessitate the will: nor by uncertain and accidental inferences, such as this; 'the memory of praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us'(he should say, dispose us) 'to elect what we elect; but the memory of these things is from the sense, and the sense from the operation of the external objects, and the agency of external objects is only from God; therefore all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary'. (c) To pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found

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(c) "To pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this sorite, it is just like an old philosophical piece: he that drinks well, sleeps well; he that sleeps well, thinks no hurt; he that thinks no hurt, lives well; therefore he that drinks well, lives well." My argument was thus: "election is always from the memory of good and evil sequels; memory is always from the sense; and sense always from the action of external bodies; and all action from God; therefore all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are from God, and consequently necessary". Let the Bishop compare now his scurrilous argumentation with this of mine; and tell me, whether he that sleeps well, doth all his lifetime think no hurt.

(d)

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not just, but justice itself, nor eternal, but eternity itself'. It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his head over-much with reading School-divines, or metaphysicians." They are unseemly words to be said of God: I will not say, blasphemous and atheistical, which are the attributes he gives to my opinions, because I do not think them spoken out of an evil mind, but out of error: they are, I say, unseemly words to be said of God, that he is not just, that he is not eternal, and (as he also said) that he is not wise; and cannot be excused by any following but, especially when the but is followed by that which is not to be understood. Can any man understand how justice is just, or wisdom wise? and whereas justice is an accident,

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is my reply upon his answer to my positive doctrine on this subject.

MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY NO. XXV.

T. H. First, I conceive that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain action; if he have no time to deliberate, the doing or abstaining necessarily followeth the present thought he had of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden fear the thought of escape. Also when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. These actions I call voluntary. He, if I

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can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden; because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death: because all the time wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation; and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election.

J. D. "This part of T. H.'s discourse hangs together like a sick man's dreams. (a) Even now he tells us, that 'a man may have time to deliberate, yet not deliberate.'By and by he saith, that 'no action of a man, though never so sudden, can be said to be

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such killing to be no crime, I think was never heard of.

NO. XXVI.

T. H. Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do a thing, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or acquit the action of which he deliberateth.

J. D. (a) "If I did not know what deliberation was, I should be little relieved in my

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T. H. Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do a thing, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or acquit the action of which he deliberateth.

J. D. (a) "If I did not know what deliberation was, I should be little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes it to be a consideration, or an act of the understanding;

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in respect of the form, and it is moved in respect of the matter. Much more man, who hath a perfect knowledge and prenotion of the end, is most properly said to move himself. Yet I do not deny but that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do concur with the will: some outward, as the first cause by general influence, which is evermore requisite, angels or men by persuading, evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility, the understanding by directing. So passions and acquired habits. But I deny that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one, except God alone, who doth it rarely, in extraordinary cases. And where there is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute necessity, but

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proof offered but every man's own experience, by reflecting on himself, and remembering what he useth to have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent or that action is free. Now, he that so reflecteth on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that deliberation is the considering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come; that by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding; for else nothing is meant by it; that will is the last act of our deliberation; that a free agent, is he that can do if he will and forbear if he will; and that liberty is the absence of external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but

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Every indeliberate action is not spontaneous; the fire considers not whether it should burn, yet the burning of it is not spontaneous. Neither is every spontaneous action indeliberate; a man may deliberate what he will eat, and yet eat it spontaneously. (d) Neither doth deliberation properly signify, the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to come, but the considering whether this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest means for obtaining such an end. The physician doth not deliberate whether he should cure his patient, but by what means he should cure him. Deliberation is of the means, not of the end. (e) Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. that deliberation is an

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agent itself; and is in all things that have sense the same with voluntary, whether deliberated or not deliberated. And therefore where he distinguished it from voluntary, I thought he might mean indeliberate. But let it signify what it will, provided it be intelligible, it would make against him.

(d) "Neither doth deliberation properly signify 'the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to come'; but the considering whether this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest means, for obtaining such an end." If the Bishop's words proceeded not from hearing and reading of others, but from his own thoughts, he could never have reprehended this definition of deliberation, especially in the manner he doth it; for he says, it is the considering whether

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and reading of others, but from his own thoughts, he could never have reprehended this definition of deliberation, especially in the manner he doth it; for he says, it is the considering whether this or that be a good and fit means for obtaining such an end; as if considering whether a means be good or not, were not all one with considering whether the sequel of using those means be good or evil.

(e) "Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. that 'deliberation is an act of fancy', not of reason, common to men of discretion with madmen, natural fools, children, and brute beasts". I do indeed conceive that deliberation is an act of imagination or fancy; nay more, that reason and understanding also are acts of the imagination, that is to say, they

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the will are two distinct faculties); or 'that only the last appetite is to be called our will'." Though the understanding and the will were two distinct faculties, yet followeth it not that the will and the deliberation are two distinct faculties. For the whole deliberation is nothing else but so many wills alternatively changed, according as a man understandeth or fancieth the good and evil sequels of the thing concerning which he deliberateth whether he shall pursue it, or of the means whether they conduce or not to that end, whatsoever it be, he seeketh to obtain. So that in deliberation there be many wills, whereof not any is the cause of a voluntary action but the last; as I have said before, answering this objection in another place.

(g)

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our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain.

J. D. "Though sophistical captions do seldom work on men of wit and learning, because by constant use they have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil (Heb. v. 14), yet (a) solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them than upon weaker judgments. The more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it; especially if the proofs be proposed without passion or opposition. Let sophisters and seditious orators apply themselves to the many-headed multitude, because they despair of success

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is adjoined. As Christ (1 Tim. i. 1) is called our hope; that is, on whom our hope did depend. So, we are justified by faith; that is, by Christ applied by faith. So, love is the fulfilling of the law; that is, those things to which it is adjoined. Hope for the things hoped for; as Rom. viii. 24. So in the Epistle to the Ephesians, v. 16: The days are evil; that is, the manner, conversation, and deeds of men in the days.

Hitherto the metonymy, or change of name. Now followeth the mocking speech, or irony.

CHAPTER II.

THE mocking trope is, when one contrary is signified by another; as God said, Man is like to one of us. So Christ saith, Sleep on; and yet by-and-by,

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in the world is good enough to draw evidence out of false or unactive principles. But I detain your Lordship too long. For all this will be much more manifest in the following discourses, wherein I have not only explained and rectified many of the most important principles of geometry, but also by the examples of those errors which have been committed by my reprehenders, made manifest the evil consequence of the principles they now proceed on. So that it is not only my own defence that I here bring before you, but also a positive doctrine concerning the true grounds, or rather atoms of geometry, which I dare only say are very singular, but whether they be very good or not, I submit to your Lordship's judgment. And seeing you have been pleased to bestow so much time, with great

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esse." Nevertheless, now-a-days, uncivil words are commonly and bitterly used by all that write in matter of controversy, especially in divinity, excepting now and then such writers as have been more than ordinarily well bred, and have observed how heinous and hazardous a thing such contumely is amongst some sorts of men, whether that which is said in disgrace be true or false. For evil words by all men of understanding are taken for a defiance, and a challenge to open war. But that you should have observed so much, who are yet in your mother's belly, was not a thing to be much expected.

The faults in manners you lay to my charge are these: 1. Self-conceit. 2. That I will be very angry with all men that do not presently submit to my

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incident to human passion, yet I do not for that cause think you atheists and enemies of religion, but only ignorant and imprudent Christians. But how, I say, could you think me an atheist, unless it were because finding your doubts of the Deity more frequent than other men do, you are thereby the apter to fall upon that kind of reproach? Wherein you are like women of poor and evil education when they scold; amongst whom the readiest disgraceful word is whore: why not thief, or any other ill name, but because, when they remember themselves, they think that reproach the likeliest to be true?

Secondly, tell me what crime it was which the Latins called by the name of scelus? You think not, unless you be Stoics, that all crimes are equal.

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first part of the sentence, and some to the latter; where the signification of the word and right pointing doth show that it must be referred to the first.

The answer is, that the right and wise placing of the sentence is perverted.

Unapt setting down of the reason, is when the parts of the question and the reasons entreated, are not set down in fit words: as,

All sin is evil.

Every child of God doth sin.

Therefore every child of God is evil.

Here the answer according to logic, is that the assumption doth not take the argument out of the proposition, but putteth in another thing; and so it is no right frame of concluding, as appeareth by the definition of the assumption.

Hitherto of the deceits of reason, which lie in

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and right pointing doth show that it must be referred to the first.

The answer is, that the right and wise placing of the sentence is perverted.

Unapt setting down of the reason, is when the parts of the question and the reasons entreated, are not set down in fit words: as,

All sin is evil.

Every child of God doth sin.

Therefore every child of God is evil.

Hitherto of the deceits of reason, which lie in words. Now of the default of logic, called sophism.

It is either general

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which are inferences: and all inferences being syllogisms, a logician, if he would observe the difference between a plain syllogism and an enthymeme, which is a rhetorical syllogism, would make the best rhetorician. For all syllogisms and inferences belong properly to logic, whether they infer truth or probability. And because without this art it would often come to pass that evil men, by the advantage of natural abilities, would carry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long scientifical proofs drawn from the principles through many syllogisms; and therefore had

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logician, if he would observe the difference between a plain syllogism and an enthymeme, which is a rhetorical syllogism, would make the best rhetorician. For all syllogisms and inferences belong properly to logic, whether they infer truth or probability. And because without this art it would often come to pass that evil men, by the advantage of natural abilities, would carry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long scientifical proofs drawn from the principles through many syllogisms; and therefore had need to be instructed by the rhetorical and shorter way. Lastly,

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12. Prosperity. Which is to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to fortune.

13. Virtue. Which is then to be defined, when we speak of praise.

These are the grounds from whence we exhort.

Dehortation is from the contraries of these. CHAPTER VI. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL.

IN deliberatives, the principles or elements from whence we draw our proofs, are common opinions concerning good and evil. And these principles are either absolute or comparative. And those that are absolute, are either disputable or indisputable.

The indisputable principles are such as these: Good, is

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Which is then to be defined, when we speak of praise.

These are the grounds from whence we exhort.

Dehortation is from the contraries of these. CHAPTER VI. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL.

IN deliberatives, the principles or elements from whence we draw our proofs, are common opinions concerning good and evil. And these principles are either absolute or comparative. And those that are absolute, are either disputable or indisputable.

The indisputable principles are such as these: Good, is that which we love for itself. And that for which we love somewhat else. And that which all things desire. And that to every man which

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which we love somewhat else. And that which all things desire. And that to every man which his reason dictates. And that which when we have, we are well or satisfied. And that which satisfies. And the cause or effect of any of these. And that which preserves any of these. And that which keeps off or destroys the contrary of any of these.

Also to take the good and reject the evil, is good. And to take the greater good, rather than the less; and the lesser evil rather than the greater. Further, all virtues are good. And pleasure. And all things beautiful. And justice, valour, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other like habits. And health, beauty, strength, &c. And riches. And friends. And honour and glory. And ability to say or

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reason dictates. And that which when we have, we are well or satisfied. And that which satisfies. And the cause or effect of any of these. And that which preserves any of these. And that which keeps off or destroys the contrary of any of these.

Also to take the good and reject the evil, is good. And to take the greater good, rather than the less; and the lesser evil rather than the greater. Further, all virtues are good. And pleasure. And all things beautiful. And justice, valour, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other like habits. And health, beauty, strength, &c. And riches. And friends. And honour and glory. And ability to say or do: also towardliness, will, and the like. And whatsoever art or science. And life. And

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valour, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other like habits. And health, beauty, strength, &c. And riches. And friends. And honour and glory. And ability to say or do: also towardliness, will, and the like. And whatsoever art or science. And life. And whatsoever is just.

The disputable principles are such as follow:

That is good, whose contrary is evil. And whose contrary is good for our enemies. And whose contrary our enemies are glad of. And of which there cannot be too much. And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed. And that which many desire. And that which is praised. And that which even our enemies and evil men praise. And what good we prefer. And what we do advise. And that which is possible, is

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The disputable principles are such as follow:

That is good, whose contrary is evil. And whose contrary is good for our enemies. And whose contrary our enemies are glad of. And of which there cannot be too much. And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed. And that which many desire. And that which is praised. And that which even our enemies and evil men praise. And what good we prefer. And what we do advise. And that which is possible, is good to undertake. And that which is easy. And that which depends on our own will. And that which is proper for us to do. And what no man else can do. And whatsoever is extraordinary. And what is suitable. And that which wants a little of being at an end. And what we hope to master. And what

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we prefer. And what we do advise. And that which is possible, is good to undertake. And that which is easy. And that which depends on our own will. And that which is proper for us to do. And what no man else can do. And whatsoever is extraordinary. And what is suitable. And that which wants a little of being at an end. And what we hope to master. And what we are fit for. And what evil men do not. And what we love to do. CHAPTER VII. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL, COMPARATIVELY.

THE colours of good comparatively depend, partly, upon the following definitions of comparatives.

1. More, is so much and somewhat besides.

2. Less, is that, which and somewhat else

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And that which depends on our own will. And that which is proper for us to do. And what no man else can do. And whatsoever is extraordinary. And what is suitable. And that which wants a little of being at an end. And what we hope to master. And what we are fit for. And what evil men do not. And what we love to do. CHAPTER VII. OF THE COLOURS OR COMMON OPINIONS CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL, COMPARATIVELY.

THE colours of good comparatively depend, partly, upon the following definitions of comparatives.

1. More, is so much and somewhat besides.

2. Less, is that, which and somewhat else is so much.

3. Greater and more in number are said only comparatively to less and

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is chosen for somewhat else. And the end greater than that which is not the end. And that which less needs other things, than that which more. And that which is independent, than that which is dependent of another. And the beginning, than not the beginning.

(Seeing the beginning is a greater good or evil, than that which is not the beginning; and the end, than that which is not the end; one may argue from this colour both ways: as Leodamas against Chabrias, would have the actor more to blame than the adviser; and against Callistratus, the adviser more than the actor.)

And the cause, than not the cause. And that which hath a greater

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than that which is not the end; one may argue from this colour both ways: as Leodamas against Chabrias, would have the actor more to blame than the adviser; and against Callistratus, the adviser more than the actor.)

And the cause, than not the cause. And that which hath a greater beginning or cause. And the beginning or cause of a greater good or evil. And that which is scarce, greater than that which is plentiful; because harder to get. And that which is plentiful, than that which is scarce; because oftener in use. And that which is easy, than that which is hard. And that whose contrary is greater. And that whose want is greater. And virtue than not virtue, a

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which is plentiful; because harder to get. And that which is plentiful, than that which is scarce; because oftener in use. And that which is easy, than that which is hard. And that whose contrary is greater. And that whose want is greater. And virtue than not virtue, a greater good. Vice than not vice, a greater evil. And greater good or evil is that, the effects whereof are more honourable or more shameful. And the effects of greater virtues or vices. And the excess whereof is more tolerable, a greater good. And those things which may with more honour be desired. And the desire of better things. And those things whereof the knowledge is better. And the knowledge of better

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because harder to get. And that which is plentiful, than that which is scarce; because oftener in use. And that which is easy, than that which is hard. And that whose contrary is greater. And that whose want is greater. And virtue than not virtue, a greater good. Vice than not vice, a greater evil. And greater good or evil is that, the effects whereof are more honourable or more shameful. And the effects of greater virtues or vices. And the excess whereof is more tolerable, a greater good. And those things which may with more honour be desired. And the desire of better things. And those things whereof the knowledge is better. And the knowledge of better things. And that which wise

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knowledge is better. And the knowledge of better things. And that which wise men prefer. And that which is in better men. And that which better men choose. And that which is more, than that which is less delightful. And that which is more, than that which is less honourable. And that which we would have for ourselves and friends, a greater good; and the contrary, a greater evil. And that which is lasting, than that which is not lasting. And that which is firm, than that which is not firm. And what many desire, than what few. And what the adversary or judge confesseth to be greater, is greater. And common than not common. And not common than common. And what is more laudable. And that which is more

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lasting. And that which is firm, than that which is not firm. And what many desire, than what few. And what the adversary or judge confesseth to be greater, is greater. And common than not common. And not common than common. And what is more laudable. And that which is more honoured, a greater good. And that which is more punished, a greater evil. And both good and evil divided than undivided, appear greater. And compounded than simple, appear greater. And that which is done with opportunity, age, place, time, means disadvantageous, greater than otherwise. And that which is natural, than that which is attained unto. And the same part of that which is great, than of that which is less. And that which is

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is firm, than that which is not firm. And what many desire, than what few. And what the adversary or judge confesseth to be greater, is greater. And common than not common. And not common than common. And what is more laudable. And that which is more honoured, a greater good. And that which is more punished, a greater evil. And both good and evil divided than undivided, appear greater. And compounded than simple, appear greater. And that which is done with opportunity, age, place, time, means disadvantageous, greater than otherwise. And that which is natural, than that which is attained unto. And the same part of that which is great, than of that which is less. And that which is nearest to the end

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greater. And compounded than simple, appear greater. And that which is done with opportunity, age, place, time, means disadvantageous, greater than otherwise. And that which is natural, than that which is attained unto. And the same part of that which is great, than of that which is less. And that which is nearest to the end designed. And that which is good or evil to one's self, than that which is simply so. And possible, than not possible. And that which comes toward the end of our life. And that which we do really, than that which we do for show. And that which we would be, rather than what we would seem to be. And that which is good for more purposes, is the greater good. And that

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with more delight. And of the two, that which added to a third makes the whole the greater. And that which having, we are more sensible of. And in every thing, that which we most esteem. CHAPTER VIII. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS.

BECAUSE hortation and dehortation concern the commonwealth, and are drawn from the elements of good and evil; as we have spoken of them already in the abstract, so we must speak of them also in the concrete, that is, of what is good or evil to each sort of commonwealth in special.

The government of a commonwealth is either democracy, or aristocracy, or oligarchy, or monarchy.

Democracy is that, wherein all men with equal right are

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in every thing, that which we most esteem. CHAPTER VIII. OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS.

BECAUSE hortation and dehortation concern the commonwealth, and are drawn from the elements of good and evil; as we have spoken of them already in the abstract, so we must speak of them also in the concrete, that is, of what is good or evil to each sort of commonwealth in special.

The government of a commonwealth is either democracy, or aristocracy, or oligarchy, or monarchy.

Democracy is that, wherein all men with equal right are preferred to the highest magistracy by lot.

Aristocracy is that, wherein the highest magistrate is chosen out of those that have had the best

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will not put his adversary to his oath, may allege: That he makes no scruple to be forsworn. That by swearing he will carry the cause, which, not swearing, he must lose. That he had rather trust his cause in the hands of the judge, than of the adversary.

He that refuseth to take the oath may say: That the matter is not worth so much. That if he had been an evil man, he had sworn, and carried his cause. That to try it by swearing, for a religious man against an irreligious is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in combat.

He that is willing to take the oath, may pretend: That he had rather trust himself, than his adversary; and that it is equal dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a

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That think they excel others; as the rich with the poor; the noble with the obscure, &c. And such as think they deserve well. And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted; and therefore sick men, poor men, lovers, and generally all that desire and attain not, are angry with those that, standing by, are not moved by their wants. And such as having expected good, find evil.

Those that men are angry with, are: such as mock, deride, or jest at them. And such as shew any kind of contumely towards them. And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon; and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein. And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends. And such as have honoured us, if they continue not. And such

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such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon; and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein. And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends. And such as have honoured us, if they continue not. And such as requite not our courtesy. And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiors. And our friends, if they have said or done us evil, or not good. And such as give not ear to our entreaty. And such as are joyful or calm in our distress. And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled. And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces. And such as neglect us in the presence of our competitors, of those we admire, of those we would have admire us, of those we reverence, and of those that reverence us. And such as

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Hence it appears how the judge or auditor may be made friend or enemy to us, and how our adversary may be made appear friend or enemy to the judge; and how we may answer to our adversary, that would make us appear enemies to him. CHAPTER VI.

OF FEAR.

Fear is a trouble or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy. Danger is the nearness of the evil feared.

The things to be feared are: such as have power to hurt. And the signs of will to do us hurt; as anger and hatred of powerful men. And injustice joined with power. And valour provoked, joined with power. And the fear of powerful men.

The men that are to be

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to us, and how our adversary may be made appear friend or enemy to the judge; and how we may answer to our adversary, that would make us appear enemies to him. CHAPTER VI.

OF FEAR.

Fear is a trouble or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy. Danger is the nearness of the evil feared.

The men that are to be feared, are: such as know our faults. And such as can do us injury. And such as

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more to be feared than those that are hasty and free.

The things especially to be feared, are: such, wherein if we err, the error cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our adversary's pleasure. And such as admit either none, or not easy help. And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them.

They that fear not are: such as expect not evil; or not now; or not this; or not from these. And therefore men fear little in prosperity. And men fear little, that think they have suffered already.

An orator therefore that would put fear into the auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater than he do suffer and have suffered from those, and at those times, they least thought. CHAPTER VII. OF

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that think they have suffered already.

Assurance is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evil afar off.

The things therefore that beget assurance are: the remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the nearness of their contraries. And the facility of great or many helps or remedies. And neither to have done, nor received injury. And to have no competitors, or not great ones; or if great ones, at least friends, such as we have obliged, or are obliged to. And that the

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equals or inferiors not afraid. And they, that have wherewith to make themselves feared; as wealth, strength, &c. And such as have done others no wrong. And such as think themselves in good terms with God Almighty. And such as think they will speed well, that are gone before. CHAPTER VIII. OF SHAME.

Shame is a perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a man's own, or his friends'reputation.

The things therefore which men are ashamed of, are those actions which proceed from vice: as to throw away one's arms, to run away, signs of cowardliness. To deny that which is committed to one's trust, a sign of injustice. To have lain with whom, where, and when, we ought not, signs of

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also consider not. And they that are in the act of contumely; for neither do these consider. And they that are astonished with fear. And they that think no man honest.

The things to be pitied are: such as grieve, and withal hurt. Such as destroy. And calamities of fortune, if they be great: as none or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, &c. And evil that arrives where good is expected. And after extreme evil, a little good. And through a man's life to have no good offer itself; or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it.

Men to be pitied are: such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own. And such as be of our own years. Such as are like us in manners. Such as are of the same, or

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for neither do these consider. And they that are astonished with fear. And they that think no man honest.

The things to be pitied are: such as grieve, and withal hurt. Such as destroy. And calamities of fortune, if they be great: as none or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, &c. And evil that arrives where good is expected. And after extreme evil, a little good. And through a man's life to have no good offer itself; or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it.

Men to be pitied are: such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own. And such as be of our own years. Such as are like us in manners. Such as are of the same, or like stock. And our equals in dignity. Those that have lately

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they are, that rejoice or grieve not at the adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said. bes: WHRT Bk. 2 Ch. 11 p. 464

Whoever therefore would turn away the compassion of the judge, he must make him apt to indignation; and shew that his adversary is unworthy of the good, and worthy of the evil which happens to him. CHAPTER XII. OF ENVY.

Envy is grief for the prosperity of such as ourselves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive.

Such as ourselves, I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means.

They are apt to envy: that are within a little of the

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They are slaves to gain. And live more by reason than custom; because reason leads to profit, as custom to that which is honourable. And do injury to endamage, and not in contumely. And are merciful by compassion, or imagination of the same evils in themselves; which is a kind of infirmity, and not humanity, as in young men, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer evil. And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from evil because of their infirmity.

Seeing then every man loves such men and their discourses which are most agreeable to their own manners; it is not hard to collect, how the orator and his oration may be made acceptable to the hearer, whether young or old. CHAPTER XVI. OF THE MANNERS OF

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because reason leads to profit, as custom to that which is honourable. And do injury to endamage, and not in contumely. And are merciful by compassion, or imagination of the same evils in themselves; which is a kind of infirmity, and not humanity, as in young men, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer evil. And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from evil because of their infirmity.

THE manners of middle-aged men, are

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proceeding from the vanity of the hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the hearer holds. Another is, that sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be esteemed good sentences, he shall be esteemed a good man; and if evil, an evil man.

Thus much of sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit. CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE INVENTION OF ENTHYMEMES.

SEEING an enthymeme differs from a logical syllogism, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote principles; the places of it, from whence a man may argue,

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from the vanity of the hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the hearer holds. Another is, that sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be esteemed good sentences, he shall be esteemed a good man; and if evil, an evil man.

Thus much of sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit. CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE INVENTION OF ENTHYMEMES.

SEEING an enthymeme differs from a logical syllogism, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote principles; the places of it, from whence a man may argue, ought to

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An ostensive enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat granted.

That enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility, is an enthymeme wherein from that which the adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible.

All places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent propositions of good, evil, just, unjust, honourable, and dishonourable: namely, they have been set down as applied to particular subjects, or in concrete. Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the abstract or universal.

The first place, then, let be from contraries; which in the concrete or particulars is exemplified thus. If

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as, If all men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible; and the accuser charge not the defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.

A tenth from induction: as, At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c.; and therefore every where.

An eleventh from authority, or precedent sentence; as that of Sappho, that Death is evil; for that the gods have judged it so, in excepting themselves from mortality.

A twelfth from the consequence; as, It is not good to be envied; therefore neither to be learned. It is good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.

A thirteenth from two contrary consequences; as, It is not good to be an orator; because if he speak the

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same. As, to the adversary that proves love to be good by an enthymeme, may be objected, that, No want is good, and yet love is want; or particularly thus, The love of Myrrha to her father was not good.

The second from contraries. As, if the adversary say, A good man does good to his friends, an objection might be made, that then an evil man will do also evil to his friends.

The third from similitude. As thus, if the adversary say, all men that are injured do hate those that have injured them, it may be objected, that then all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grateful.

The fourth from the authority of famous men. As

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the adversary that proves love to be good by an enthymeme, may be objected, that, No want is good, and yet love is want; or particularly thus, The love of Myrrha to her father was not good.

The second from contraries. As, if the adversary say, A good man does good to his friends, an objection might be made, that then an evil man will do also evil to his friends.

The fourth from the authority of famous men. As when a man shall say,

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mother was Priam's sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his father was Priam's enemy.

A thirteenth, proper to crimination only, from praise and dispraise mixed; as, to praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.

A fourteenth, common both to crimination and purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact. For he that purgeth himself, interpreteth the fact always in the best sense; and he that criminates, always in the worst; as when Ulysses said, Diomedes chose him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians,

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XVIII. OF THE EPILOGUE.

THE epilogue must consist of one of these four things.

Either of inclining the judge to favour his own, or disfavour the adversary's side. For then, when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties.

Or of amplification or diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is.

Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge.

Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said.

Repetition consisteth

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things.

Either of inclining the judge to favour his own, or disfavour the adversary's side. For then, when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties.

Or of amplification or diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is.

Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge.

Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said.

Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner. For the orator must show that he has

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the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties.

Or of amplification or diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is.

Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge.

Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said.

Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner. For the orator must show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his oration; and how, namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with his

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